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HEALTH LAW AS SOCIAL JUSTICE
Lindsay F. Wiley*
Health law is in the midst of a dramatic transformation.  From a
relatively narrow discipline focused on regulating relationships among
individual patients, health care providers, and third-party payers, it is
expanding into a far broader field with a burgeoning commitment to ac-
cess to health care and assurance of healthy living conditions as matters
of social justice.  Through a series of incremental reform efforts stretch-
ing back decades before the Affordable Care Act and encompassing pub-
lic health law as well as the law of health care financing and delivery,
reducing health disparities has become a central focus of American
health law and policy.  This Article labels, describes, and furthers a nas-
cent “health justice” movement by examining what it means to view
health law as an instrument of social justice.  Drawing on the exper-
iences of the reproductive justice, environmental justice, and food justice
movements, and on the writings of political philosophers and ethicists on
health justice, I propose that health justice offers an alternative to the
market competition and patient rights paradigms that currently dominate
health law scholarship, advocacy, and reform.  I then examine the role of
law in reducing health disparities through the health justice lens.  I ar-
gue that the nascent health justice framework suggests three commit-
ments for the use of law to reduce health disparities.  First, to a broader
inquiry that views access to health care as one among many social deter-
minants of health deserving of public attention and resources. Second, to
probing inquiry into the effects of class, racial, and other forms of social
and cultural bias on the design and implementation of measures to re-
duce health disparities.  And third, to collective action grounded in com-
munity engagement and participatory parity.  In exploring these
commitments, I highlight tensions within the social justice framework
and between the social justice framework and the nascent health justice
movement.  These tensions illustrate, rather than undermine, the power
of viewing health law as social justice.  They raise important questions
that should prompt more fruitful and rigorous thinking within health law
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activism and scholarship and with regard to the relationships between
law and social justice more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION
“[The dream] that preventable death and disability ought
to be minimized is a dream of social justice.”
—Dan Beauchamp, Public Health as Social Justice1
African-Americans are eight times more likely to be diagnosed with
HIV, twice as likely to die within the first year of life, and 50% more
likely to die prematurely of heart disease or stroke than their non-His-
panic white peers.2  Non-Hispanic black children are about 1.6 times as
likely to be diagnosed with asthma than are their Hispanic or non-His-
panic white peers, and they are six to seven times as likely to die of
1 Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health as Social Justice, 13 INQUIRY 6 (1976), reprinted in
NEW ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 101, 105 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock
eds., 1999).
2 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Health Disparities and Inequalities
Report – United States, 2013, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT Nov. 22, 2013, at 1,
113.
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asthma.3  Hispanic women are 1.6 times as likely as non-Hispanic white
women, and people living in poverty are about twice as likely as those
with higher incomes, to be diagnosed with diabetes.4  Over the last few
decades, life expectancy has increased dramatically among people in the
top half of the income distribution, while remaining nearly flat among
those in the bottom half,5 and even declining among women in many
parts of the country.6  Average life expectancy can vary by as much as
twenty-five years between neighborhoods just a few miles apart.7
Reducing social disparities in health8 has become a central—and
deeply controversial—theme of the American health reform agenda.9
3 Lara J. Akinbami et al., Status of Childhood Asthma in the United States, 1980-2007,
123 PEDIATRICS S131 (2009).  Notably, Puerto Rican children have the highest rates of
asthma—they are about 1.5 times as likely as non-Hispanic black children, 2.5 times as likely
as non-Hispanic white children and about three times as likely as Mexican-American children
to be diagnosed. Id.
4 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 2, at 101. R
5 Peter G. Peterson Foundation, Increases in Longevity Have Gone Largely to High
Earners, PETER G. PETERSON FOUND. (July 1, 2011), http://pgpf.org/Chart-Archive/0015_life-
expectancy (discussing data from a 2007 Social Security Administration Report).
6 See, e.g., David A. Kindig & Erika R. Cheng, Even as Mortality Fell in Most U.S.
Counties, Female Mortality Nonetheless Rose in 42.8% of Counties From 1992 to 2006, 32
HEALTH AFFAIRS 451, 453 (2013); Haidong Wang et al., Left Behind, Widening Disparities for
Males and Females in US County Life Expectancy, POPULATION HEALTH NMETRICS, no. 8,
July 10, 2013, at 3, http://www.pophealthmetrics.com/content/11/1/8.
7 Comm’n to Build a Healthier Am., Robert Wood Johnson Found., New Orleans: Short
Distances to Large Disparities in Health, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., http://www.rwjf
.org/content/dam/images/Sandbox/2013%20Commission/Charts/fig5_Health_NOLA.pdf (last
visited Aug. 31, 2014).
8 I use the term “social disparities” to refer to disparities among racial and ethnic
groups, as well as disparities along economic, gender conformity, functional ability, and geo-
graphic lines. See MICHAEL MARMOT & RICHARD G. WILKINSON, SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF
HEALTH 2 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the “social gradient in health,” by which social position
determines health status, as demonstrating “how sensitive health is to social and economic
factors, . . . enabl[ing] us to identify the determinants of health among the population as a
whole.”).  A few racial disparities are biologically or genetically determined and therefore not
amenable to intervention, but scientists are largely in agreement that the majority of racial
disparities with regard to health outcomes are determined by social factors, as one would
expect given the evidence that race and ethnicity are primarily social and political categories
without a strong genetic or biological basis. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW
SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2011).
9 FAMILIES USA MINORITY HEALTH INITIATIVE, ISSUE BRIEF: MOVING TOWARD
HEALTH EQUITY: HEALTH REFORM CREATES A FOUNDATION FOR ELIMINATING DISPARITIES
(May 2010), available at http://www.sph.umich.edu/sep/downloads/IssueBriefMay10.pdf (not-
ing that the Affordable Care Act “provides a critical foundation for addressing racial and
ethnic health disparities through a number of key provisions—both those that will affect every-
one but have a disproportionate impact on communities of color, as well as those that are
designed specifically to eliminate health disparities”); KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH RE-
FORM AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARI-
TIES (Sept. 2010), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/
8016-02.pdf (discussing “key provisions of the [Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act]
that will expand health coverage and are likely to improve access to care for people of color, as
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From a relatively narrow discipline focused on highly individualistic in-
teractions among patients, health care providers, and third-party payers,10
health law is expanding into a far broader field committed to assuring
healthy living conditions and access to health care.  Legal scholars exam-
ining these developments have begun to draw parallels between health
law and other socially conscious fields like civil rights law,11 disability
law,12 and human rights law,13 while largely maintaining an emphasis on
individual rights of access to affordable, high-quality health care.  In-
deed, the competing health law paradigms of “patient rights” and “mar-
ket competition” are united in their near-exclusive focus on health care
access and rationing of health care resources.14  At the same time, politi-
well as some of the other provisions that will likely have either a direct or indirect impact on
health disparities”).  A documentary series, Unnatural Causes, which aired on PBS in the
spring of 2008 and again in October 2009 while health reform was being actively debated in
Congress, raised public awareness of health disparities and the social determinants of health.
Excerpts from the series were shown as part of health reform town hall and community forum
events across the country. See Press Release, Unnatural Causes, Award-Winning Documen-
tary Series Changing the Way Americans Think About Health to Be Rebroadcast by PBS,
available at http://www.unnaturalcauses.org/assets/uploads/file/Press_Rebroadcast.pdf (last
visited Sept. 7, 2014).
10 See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Where Is the “There” in Health Law: Can It
Become a Coherent Field?, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 101, 103–04 (2004) (proposing “an analytical
framework that views health care law as a law of relational webs [among patients, their family
and friends, physicians, medical institutions, health insurers, and employers] rather than a law
of transactions.”); Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 369–70 (2006) (describing health law as “address[ing] a unique
set of relations among persons involved in the treatment of health problems” including pa-
tients, doctors, hospitals, employers and the government “that affect our health care”); William
M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between Individual
Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 501 (2008) (“A relational perspec-
tive, particularly where the delivery of medical services is concerned, is a defining characteris-
tic of American health law.”).
11 See Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health
Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855 (2012) [hereinafter Watson, Section 1557]; Sid-
ney D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City, Asking the Right Question, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1697 (1993); Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI Defending Health Care Discrimina-
tion—It Shouldn’t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (1990); Sidney D. Watson, Race,
Ethnicity and Quality of Care, Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM J.L. & MED. 203 (2001).
12 See Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963,
1964 (2013) (“[T]he ACA constitutes one of the most significant civil rights victories for the
disability community in recent history.”).
13 See Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, Global Health Law Norms and the PPACA Frame-
work to Eliminate Health Disparities, 55 HOW. L.J. 887 (2012).
14 See Hall & Schneider, supra note 10, at 102 (describing the “patient’s rights” ap- R
proach, which “at heart hopes that medicine can be regulated by endowing patients with rights
of autonomy to which medical professionals and institutions must defer” and the “law and
economics approach,” which “at heart hopes that medicine can be regulated in the market, by
consumers making purchasing decisions that discipline medical institutions,” as the two “com-
peting paradigms” of health law); Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14
HEALTH MATRIX 155, 155 (2004) (describing the rise of the “modestly egalitarian social con-
tract” paradigm in which the role of law is “to achieve a fair resolution of conflicting interests,
especially in the light of highly unequal information and power between patients and [physi-
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cal philosophers and ethicists have begun a productive discussion of the
multi-faceted relationship between health and social justice, which
ranges far beyond individual health-care rights to focus on collective
needs and problem solving with regard to the social determinants of
health, broadly defined.15
This Article explores what it means to view health law as social
justice.  I propose “health justice” as a distinct alternative to the “patient
rights” and “market competition” paradigms that currently dominate
health law scholarship, advocacy, and reform.16  I define health law
broadly to encompass the law of health care financing and delivery as
well as public health law, which concerns the state’s authority and obli-
cians and other stakeholders with interests in the health care system],” with “fairness . . .
typically . . . articulated as access to care largely on the basis of medical need, high quality of
care, and respect for patient autonomy and dignity” and the rise of “market competition” (as an
alternative to the modestly egalitarian social contract paradigm), in which the role of law “is to
ensure that choices about health insurance and health services are made by individuals based
on their own financial resources (assuming them to be above some specified minimum),
and . . . to eliminate as much as possible hidden ‘cross-subsidies.’”); cf. Einer Elhauge, Allo-
cating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1994) (describing four competing health
law paradigms, all of which focus on access to health care and rationing of health care
resources).
15 See SRIDHAR VENKATAPURAM, HEALTH JUSTICE (2011); SHLOMI SEGALL, HEALTH,
LUCK, AND JUSTICE (2010); JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2009); NOR-
MAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY (2008); MADISON POWERS &
RUTH FADEN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH
POLICY (2006).
Social determinants of health are conditions in the environments in which people are
born, live, learn, work, play, worship, and age that affect a wide range of health,
functioning, and quality-of-life outcomes and risks.  Conditions (e.g., social, eco-
nomic, and physical) in these various environments and settings (e.g., school,
church, workplace, and neighborhood) have been referred to as “place.”  In addition
to the more material attributes of “place,” the patterns of social engagement and
sense of security and well-being are also affected by where people live.  Resources
that enhance quality of life can have a significant influence on population health
outcomes.  Examples of these resources include safe and affordable housing, access
to education, public safety, availability of healthy foods, local emergency/health ser-
vices, and environments free of life-threatening toxins.
Social Determinants of Health, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, available at http://www.healthypeople
.gov/2020/topicsobjectives2020/overview.aspx?topicid=39#five (last visited Sept. 18, 2014)
(describing the Social Determinants of Health as a new topic for the Healthy People 2020
initiative whereby the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services identifies ten-year goals
and objectives for health promotion and disease prevention); see also World Conference on
Social Determinants of Health, Rio Political Declaration on Social Determinants of Health,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (October 2011), http://www.who.int/sdhconference/declaration/Rio_po
litical_declaration.pdf?ua=1 (“Health inequities arise from the societal conditions in which
people are born, grow, live, work and age, referred to as social determinants of health.  These
include early years’ experiences, education, economic status, employment and decent work,
housing and environment, and effective systems of preventing and treating ill health.”)
16 See note 14, supra.
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gation to assure healthy living conditions.17  I describe social justice as a
communitarian approach (in its emphasis on collective problems and col-
lective problem-solving) to ensuring the essential conditions for human
well-being, including redistribution of social and economic goods and
recognition of all people as equal participants in social and political life.
Rather than merely adopting social justice as the “core value” of public
health as Beauchamp and others have done,18 I argue that social justice is
emerging as a core value of health law and policy writ large.
I suggest that the convergence of three distinct social movements
(environmental justice, reproductive justice, and food justice) on health
disparities as a central focus; the growing prominence of health dispari-
ties as a focus of health reform efforts; the recent boom in “health and
social justice” monographs by political philosophers and ethicists; and
the growing emphasis on social consciousness (as opposed to distinctly
individualistic values like patient autonomy) in health law scholarship
might together indicate the beginnings of a loosely defined “health jus-
tice” movement.  Bearing in mind that this movement—if it can even be
described as such—is in its infancy, I sketch out the basic contours of its
potential influence on health law scholarship, advocacy, and reform by
examining the use of law as a tool for reducing health disparities through
the health justice lens.
This Article proceeds in Part I with an exploration of the social jus-
tice framework and its manifestation in three ongoing movements that
focus on health disparities—environmental justice, reproductive justice,
and food justice.  Part II describes the health law toolkit for reducing
health disparities by ensuring access to affordable, high-quality health
care, encouraging healthier behaviors, and creating healthier living con-
ditions.  Part III draws on the social justice framework described in Part
17 Public health law is commonly treated as a distinct sub-field within health law.
It is defined as the study of the legal powers and duties of the state to assure the
conditions for people to be healthy (to identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to
health in the population) and the limitations on the power of the state to constrain the
autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, or other legally protected interests of indi-
viduals for the common good.
LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
(3d ed. forthcoming 2015) (manuscript on file with author).  Public health law is distinguished
by its population orientation and prevention focus, with an emphasis on “upstream” interven-
tions to prevent disease by encouraging healthier behaviors and creating healthier communities
rather than “downstream” health care interventions.
18 Lawrence O. Gostin & Madison Powers, What Does Social Justice Require for the
Public’s Health: Public Health Ethics and Policy Imperatives, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1053, 1053
(2006) (“Justice is viewed as so central to the mission of public health that it has been de-
scribed as the field’s core value.”); cf. Sage, supra note 10, at 519 (“[P]ublic health law repre- R
sents the paradigm case for a regulatory, collective approach to health policy, but has been
marginalized both legally and financially compared with the diagnosis and treatment of indi-
vidual patients.”).
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I, as well as the recent writings of ethicists and political philosophers on
health and social justice, to assess the health disparities interventions de-
scribed in Part II.  I argue that the nascent health justice framework sug-
gests three commitments for the use of law as a tool for reducing health
disparities: First, to a broad scope of inquiry and action that puts access
to health care in its place as one among many social determinants of
health.  Second, to collective responsibility for creating healthier com-
munities and probing inquiry into the effects of social and cultural bias
on the design and implementation of measures to reduce health dispari-
ties.  And third, to collective action grounded in community engagement
and participatory parity.
I do not claim that the social justice framework offers definitive
answers to the fraught questions permeating current health law debates.  I
highlight tensions within the social justice framework, and between the
social justice framework and the nascent health justice movement.  These
tensions illustrate, rather than undermine, the power of viewing health
law as social justice.  In sketching out the potential influence of health
justice as a framework for legal scholarship, advocacy, and reform, I
seek to raise important questions that are ripe for future inquiry within
and beyond the field of health law.
I. THE SOCIAL JUSTICE FRAMEWORK
Three recent social movements—environmental justice, reproduc-
tive justice, and food justice—have adopted health disparities as a central
focus and offer valuable lessons for health law scholarship, advocacy,
and reform.  Each has emerged as a critique from within a progressive
project that preceded it.  The environmental justice movement originated
as a civil-rights based attack on the process and outcomes of environ-
mental protection.  The reproductive justice movement began as a cri-
tique by women of color working from within the pro-choice movement.
And the food justice movement emerged in response to concerns about
elitism in the alternative (fresh/unprocessed/healthy/local/etc.) food
movement.  In each case, the response has involved particular attention
to the wide-ranging impacts of income inequality and white privilege,
with eventual expansion to address other issues of bias and structural
advantage such as ableism,19 privileged gender expression,20 hetero-
19 See, e.g., Valerie Ann Johnson, Bringing Together Feminist Disability Studies and
Environmental Justice, CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES (Feb. 2011), http://www.centerwo
menpolicy.org/programs/waxmanfiduccia/BFWFP_BringingTogetherFeministDisabilityStud
iesandEnvironmentalJustice_ValerieAnnJohnso.pdf; Mia Mingus, Georgians for Choice, Dis-
abled Women and Reproductive Justice, THE PRO-CHOICE PUB. EDUC. PROJECT, http://protect
choice.org/article.php?id=140 (last visited Aug. 31 2014).
20 See, e.g., NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND
ACTIVISM (Rachel Stein ed., 2004); Laura Nixon, The Right to (Trans) Parent: A Reproductive
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normativity,21 and nativism.22  Before turning to an examination of what
it means to add “justice” to the projects of environmental protection, re-
productive health, or food system sustainability, I will take a moment to
consider what it means to add “social” to justice.
A. What is Social Justice?
A 2006 United Nations report refers to social justice as “a recent
and politically charged concept.”23  The choice of the term “social jus-
tice” reflects “the idea that all developments relating to justice occur in
society” and “the related desire to restore the comprehensive, overarch-
ing concept of the term ‘social,’ which in recent times has been relegated
to the status of an appendix of the economic sphere.”24  It is inherently
communitarian in its
attention to what is often ignored in contemporary policy
debates: the social side of human nature; the responsibil-
ities that must be borne by citizens, individually and col-
Justice Approach to Reproductive Rights, Fertility, and Family-Building Issues Facing Trans-
gender People, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73 (2013).
21 See, e.g., Alisa Wellek & Miriam Yeung, The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender
Cmty. Ctr., Reproductive Justice and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Liberation, THE
PRO-CHOICE PUB. EDUC. PROJECT, http://protectchoice.org/article.php?id=135 (last visited
Aug. 31, 2014); Pro-Choice Pub. Educ. Project & Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & Transgender
Cmty. Ctr., Silenced Bodies: Conversations with Gay Men, Bisexual & Transgender Persons,
and Queer Women of Color on Sexual & Reproductive Health, Rights & Justice, THE CENTER
6,  http://www.gaycenter.org/files/imce/docs/causesSilencedbodies.pdf.
22 See, e.g., Immigrant Power for Environmental Health and Justice, CHINESE PROGRES-
SIVE ASS’N, http://www.cpasf.org/node/12 (last visited Aug. 31, 2014); Jessica Gonzales-Rojas
& Aishia Glasford, Nat’l Latina Inst. for Reprod. Health, Immigrant Rights and Reproductive
Justice, THE PRO-CHOICE PUB. EDUC. PROJECT, http://protectchoice.org/article.php?id=136
(last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
23 International Forum for Social Development, Nov. 2001–Nov. 2004, , Social Justice
in an Open World: The Role of the United Nations 11, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/305 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ifsd/SocialJustice.pdf. “Recent” is relative of
course:
[T]he notion of social justice is relatively new.  None of history’s great philoso-
phers—not Plato or Aristotle, or Confucius or Averroes, or even Rousseau or
Kant—saw the need to consider justice or the redress of injustices from a social
perspective.  The concept first surfaced in Western thought and political language in
the wake of the industrial revolution . . . as an expression of protest against what was
perceived as the capitalist exploitation of labour and as a focal point for the develop-
ment of measures to improve the human condition . . . .  Following the revolutions
that shook Europe in the mid-1800s, social justice became a rallying cry for progres-
sive thinkers and political activists . . . .  By the mid-twentieth century, the concept
of social justice had become central to the ideologies and programmes of virtually all
the leftist and centrist political parties around the world . . . .  Social justice became
more clearly defined when a distinction was drawn between the social sphere and the
economic sphere.
Id. at 11–12.
24 Id. at 3.
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lectively, in a regime of rights; the fragile ecology of
families and their supporting communities; the ripple ef-
fects and long-term consequences of present decisions.25
Social justice is perhaps most easily understood as an alternative to
“market justice.”26  A rejection of “the prevailing political consensus,
whether explicitly or implicitly endorsed, . . . that it is not the responsi-
bility of the state to tinker with the outcomes of a market system in
which everyone is freely allowed the opportunity to buy and sell.”27  In
our current political climate, this contrast between market justice and
social justice risks conflation of market justice with something like
“whatever political conservatives or libertarians identify as their goals”
and social justice with something like “whatever political liberals or
progressives identify as their goals.”28  It elides important distinctions
between social justice, which emphasizes collective responsibility and
action, and progressivism, which maintains a central focus on individual
rights.  The key tenets of progressivism—that “everyone gets a fair shot,
everyone does his or her fair share, and everyone plays by the same
rules”29—might be understood as setting a high bar for “free and equal
opportunity,” rather than offering a true alternative to market justice.
“These models of justice furnish a symbolic framework or blueprint
with which to think about and react to the problems of the public, provid-
ing the basic rules to classify and categorize problems of society as to
whether they necessitate public and collective protection, or whether in-
dividual responsibility should prevail.”30  They “mak[e] visible some
conditions in society as public issues or concerns, [while] hiding, obscur-
ing or concealing other conditions that might otherwise emerge as public
25 The Responsive Communitarian Platform, THE COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK, http://
communitariannetwork.org/platform (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).  The platform was formu-
lated by a group of “academicians and social commentators” helmed by sociologist Amitai
Etzioni in 1990. Who We Are, THE COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK, http://communitariannetwork
.org/who-we-are (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
26 Beauchamp, supra note 1, at 102–08 (contrasting social justice and market justice). R
27 Andrew Bradstock, Recovering the Common Good: The Key to a Truly Prosperous
Society?, 44 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 319, 329 (2013).
28 See Anna E. Carpenter, The Project Model of Clinical Education: Eight Principles to
Maximize Student Learning and Social Justice Impact, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 39, 55–56 (2013).
Throughout legal scholarship . . . “social justice” is a term that is commonly em-
ployed but not often clearly defined [but is] typically associated with a “progressive”
political and law reform agenda . . . seek[ing] to promote substantive equality and
equality of opportunity, and to overcome the fact of legal, social, and political op-
pression, as well as the impact of oppression.
Id. at 55.
29 AL YATES & ANNE BARTLEY, PROGRESSIVE THINKING: A SYNTHESIS OF AMERICAN
PROGRESSIVE VALUES, BELIEFS AND POSITIONS (2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/131793272/Progressive-Thinking.
30 Beauchamp, supra note 1, at 102. R
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issues or problems were a different map or model of justice in hand.”31
For my purposes, the implications of each model of justice for redistribu-
tive policies and spending programs are particularly important.  Accord-
ing to the market justice model:
If some people in a society find themselves without what
might be considered the essentials of life, then that is
simply a consequence of the various transactions that
take place within the market: provided none of these
transactions is coerced . . . .  We may say that those at
the bottom of the heap have suffered bad luck or misfor-
tune, but not injustice, and therefore the appropriate re-
sponse is individual charity, not state redistribution.32
Libertarian adherents to the market justice framework have a very nar-
row understanding of coercion and thus rarely support redistribution.
Progressive adherents have a very broad understanding of coercion and
often support redistribution, but they share a primary emphasis on “a fair
distribution of opportunity.”33  In contrast, the social justice model views
assurance of the essential conditions for human well-being as the legiti-
mating purpose of government.
In addition to redistribution, social justice is also concerned with
recognition of all people as “full partners in social interaction.”34  While
redistribution attacks economic inequality, recognition attacks cultural
subordination.  The dual goals of redistribution (which emphasizes mate-
rial outcomes) and recognition (which emphasizes process, participation,
respect, and identity) threaten to pull social movements in opposing di-
rections.  But they can and should function as complementary strains of
social justice argument, allowing for advocacy strategies that combine a
“cultural politics of identity” with a “social politics of equality,” promot-
ing just distribution of economic and social goods rooted in participatory
parity.35
The social justice framework has found expression in three recent
social movements that speak to the practice and scholarship of law as a
tool for addressing disparities generally and health disparities in particu-
lar.  Although the three movements described here are diverse in their
origins and concerns, each began as a critique from within a progressive
31 Id.
32 Bradstock, supra note 27, at 329. R
33 YATES & BARTLEY, supra note 29, at 26. R
34 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 3 NEW LEFT REV. 107, 113 (2000).
35 Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition?: Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-
socialist” Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. 68, 69 (1995); see also Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the
Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation, in NANCY FRASER &
AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE
7 (2003).
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reform project that preceded it.  Three common themes emerge that are
particularly relevant to the project of this Article36: First, each movement
has rejected siloed, narrowly defined priorities in favor of a broad under-
standing of the social determinants of inequality.  Second, each move-
ment has offered an internal critique of the influence of social and
cultural biases on the aims and strategies of the progressive reform pro-
ject that preceded it.  Third, each movement has struggled to balance the
role of experts in prioritizing and achieving substantive reforms with a
commitment to community engagement and participatory parity.  In ad-
dition to detailing these common themes, I will highlight the relationship
of each movement to health disparities.
B. Environmental Justice
Galvanized by controversy over the location of waste and industrial
sites in predominantly black communities, the environmental justice
movement emerged in the 1980s as a response to “environmental ra-
cism.”37  Its focus is more expansive than that of the environmental pro-
tection movement that preceded it.  Posing crucial questions about “how
individual events reflect broader historical and societal inequities,”38 the
movement emphasizes just distribution of environmental risks and bene-
fits and recognition of socially marginalized groups in related decision-
making processes.39  Together, the sustainability and environmental jus-
36 My analysis of the first and second themes I identify here is heavily influenced by
Dean Spade. See Keynote Address at the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law Symposium:
Law Reform and Cooptation (April 2009), in 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1086, 1096 (2010)
(discussing the environmental justice, reproductive justice, and food justice movements as part
of an exploration of the relationship between “resistance to coercive gender norms” and “nar-
ratives of citizenship and belonging that undergird colonialism and white supremacy” while
noting that “[i]n each of these instances, the addition of ‘justice’ indicates a critique of nar-
rower framings [in terms of individual rights to be left alone or treated equally by the state]
and an analysis of the issues in question that centers racial and economic justice.”).
37 See Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal Meaning of a Social Movement,
15 J.L. & COM. 597, 598–607 (1996) (describing the origins of the environmental justice
movement as a response to “environmental racism” while also critiquing the framing in terms
of “racism” as opposed to “white supremacy” or “white advantage”); Alice Kaswan, Environ-
mental Justice and Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 150–51 (2013)
(noting that a siting dispute over a Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) disposal facility in a
predominantly African-American community in North Carolina in the 1980s “was a nationally
galvanizing event, sparking widespread attention to distributional, participatory, and social
environmental justice.”).
38 See Kaswan, supra note 37, at 151. R
39 See GORDON WALKER, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTS, EVIDENCE AND POLITICS
1 (2012) (defining environmental justice very broadly to encompass “the intertwining of envi-
ronment and social difference—how for some people and some social groups the environment
is an intrinsic part of living a ‘good life’ of prosperity, health and well-being, while for others
the environment is a source of threat and risk, and access to resources such as energy, water,
and greenspace is limited or curtailed . . .  [;] how some of us consume key environmental
resources at the expense of others, often in distant places, and about how the power to effect
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tice movements “guard against the risk of ‘tunnel vision’: one-dimen-
sional environmental policymaking that fixates on a single goal . . .
without considering or addressing broader implications.”40
The relationship between environmentalism and environmental jus-
tice is not entirely harmonious.  “Since at least the early 1990s, activists
from the environmental justice movement consistently have criticized
what they consider the ‘mainstream’ environmental movement’s racism,
classism, and limited activist agenda . . . .”41  In their efforts to probe the
influence of elitism on mainstream environmentalism, environmental jus-
tice advocates also grapple with difficult questions about the appropriate
role for lawyers and other experts in defining the movement’s priorities
and strategies.42  They have also sought to balance the distributive and
participatory commitments of social justice.43  Especially in cases where
Native American tribal governments have opted to allow environmen-
tally hazardous operations within their jurisdictions, legal scholars have
struggled to conceptualize and operationalize the environmental justice
movement’s commitment to procedural justice and self-determination for
socially disadvantaged communities.44
The environmental justice framework enjoys significant influence at
the federal level.  A 1994 Executive Order directed all federal agencies,
not merely the EPA, to incorporate the achievement of environmental
justice into their missions by “identifying and addressing . . . dispropor-
tionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of
[their] programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and
low-income populations.”45  But commentators argue that the environ-
change and influence environmental decision-making is unequally distributed . . . [; and] the
way that people should be treated, the way the world should be.”).
40 Id. at 171.
41 Phaedra C. Pezzullo & Ronald Sandler, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE SOCIAL JUSTICE CHALLENGE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 2
(Phaedra C. Pezzullo & Ronald Sandler eds., 2007).
42 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992) (“solutions to poor peo-
ples’ environmental problems should be found by the victims of those problems, not by envi-
ronmental lawyers”); Eleanor N. Metzger, Driving the Environmental Justice Movement
Forward: The Need for a Paternalistic Approach, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 379 (1994).
43 See Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One
Tribe’s Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63
U. COLO. L. REV. 933, 942 (1992); Giancarlo Panagia, Tota Capita Tot Sententiae: An Exten-
sion or Misapplication of Rawlsian Justice, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 283, 305 (2005); POVERTY
ALLEVIATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Yves Le Bouthillier et al. eds., 2012) (exploring
apparent tensions between the goals of poverty alleviation and environmental protection).
44 See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and Reservation Resources, 40 ENVTL. L.
437, 472–74 (2010) (arguing that these scenarios necessitate a reconceptualization of environ-
mental justice).
45 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
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mental justice framework has been watered down as it has been inte-
grated within the mainstream environmental protection project.46
Notably for my purposes, the articulation of environmental justice
in terms of disproportionate “human health or environmental effects”
would arguably encompass all health disparities within existing environ-
mental justice efforts.47  Indeed, the Interagency Working Group created
by Clinton’s Executive Order and reconvened by the Obama Administra-
tion in 201048 has, at times, interpreted the “environmental” part of “en-
vironmental justice” quite broadly.  For example, in a description of
environmental justice community outreach meetings held by the Inter-
agency Working Group in 2011, Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (DHHS) officials noted that “[e]verywhere we have gone, we have
heard repeated calls for attention to environmental justice, with people
asking for greater access to health care, clean air and water, healthy and
affordable food, community capacity building through grants and techni-
cal assistance, and training to educate the health workforce about envi-
ronmentally associated health conditions.”49
DHHS strategies developed pursuant to E.O. 12898 frequently ref-
erence the agency’s broader efforts to increase access to health care,
healthy food, and healthy living conditions, but with an emphasis on how
those efforts are particularly relevant to the narrower environmental jus-
tice project of “reducing the health disparities that may result from dis-
proportionate exposures to environmental hazards in minority and low-
income populations and Indian Tribes.”50  For example, DHHS officials
emphasize national objectives in traditional environmental protection ar-
eas like “outdoor air quality, surface and ground water quality, [and]
toxic substances and hazardous wastes.”51  EPA officials, in turn,
recognize that addressing environmental health dispari-
ties through the lens of EPA is touching the tip of the
iceberg in communities that experience environmental
justice issues.  Although EPA’s actions focus on racial/
ethnic and income differences in environmental health
outcomes, they directly relate and contribute to the
46 See, e.g., Mike Ewall, Legal Tools for Environmental Equity vs. Environmental Jus-
tice, 13 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 4–5(2012–2013) (criticizing EPA’s watering down
of the environmental justice framework).
47 Exec. Order 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7629 (emphasis added).
48 See Kaswan, supra note 37, at 153–55. R
49 J. Nadine Gracia & Howard K. Koh, Promoting Environmental Justice, 101 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S14, S15 (2011) (emphasis added).
50 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 2012 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 6 (2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/environmen
taljustice/strategy.pdf.
51 Gracia & Koh, supra note 49, at S15. R
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broader conversation within the health sector to elimi-
nate health disparities . . . .  [P]opulations that experi-
ence health disparities related to other social
determinants of health, such as access to health care and
access to healthy foods, tend to be the same populations
that live in communities overburdened with environmen-
tal pollution.52
The fact that federal agencies have explicitly adopted a broad-based
and cross-cutting commitment to environmental justice is fortuitous for
my purpose here.  On the other hand, given that environmental justice
began as a critique of mainstream environmental protection law, EPA
responsibility for ensuring environmental justice arguably amounts to
“[a]sking the fox to guard the henhouse.”53  A 1998 administrative deci-
sion regarding a Title VI complaint filed with the agency’s Office of
Civil Rights illustrates the pitfalls of asking an agency—whose mandate
adopts a market-justice oriented conception of government’s cabined role
in ensuring environmental protection—to add a thin veneer of social jus-
tice to its activities.  Ruling on a complaint filed against Michigan’s en-
vironmental agency for permitting a steel company to build a new mill in
the predominantly African-American neighborhood of Flint, Michigan,
the EPA “assumed that the proposed steel mill would be in compliance
with environmental laws, and held that complying with environmental
laws means that there would be no ‘adverse effect’ on the community”
and therefore no discriminatory effect.54  This decision and others indi-
cate that, notwithstanding E.O. 12898, the breadth of the environmental
justice mission is still very much in dispute within the EPA.
C. Reproductive Justice
The SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collabora-
tive (a network of eighty grassroots organizations) defines reproductive
justice in terms of “the right to have children, not have children, and to
parent the children we have in safe and healthy environments.”55  It has
52 Onyemaechi C. Nweke & Charles Lee, Achievement of Environmental Justice: Per-
spectives on the Path Forward Through Collective Action to End Health Disparities, 101 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH S6, S6 (2011).
53 See Ewall, supra note 46, at 9; see also Kaswan, supra note 37 (discussing the tension R
between environmental justice and dominant environmental law paradigms as one explanation
for the limited impact of federal administrative environmental justice initiatives, but ultimately
lauding EPA efforts under the Clinton and Obama administrations to “provide mechanisms for
citizen and grassroots input”).
54 Ewall, supra note 46, at 10. R
55 Why is Reproductive Justice Important for Women of Color?, SISTER SONG, http://
www.sistersong.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Itemid=81 (last
visited Aug. 31, 2014).
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been described as a transformation of the pro-choice movement for abor-
tion rights.56  “[H]ighlighting the lived experience of reproductive op-
pression in communities of color,” the reproductive justice movement
“represents a shift for women advocating for control of their bodies from
a narrower focus on legal access and individual choice (the focus of
mainstream organizations) to a broader analysis of racial, economic, cul-
tural, and structural constraints on our power.”57
From its inception, the reproductive justice movement has been
globally conscious and explicitly tied to the environmental justice move-
ment.  Although the term “reproductive justice” and the emphasis on the
experiences of women of color were developed as a critique from within
the U.S. pro-choice community, Loretta Ross, a key figure in the repro-
ductive justice movement, traces the movement’s roots to the 1994 Inter-
national Conference on Population and Development in Cairo.58  “The
1994 Conference was explicitly given a broader mandate on develop-
ment issues than previous population conferences, reflecting the growing
awareness that population, poverty, patterns of production and consump-
tion and the environment are so closely interconnected that none of them
can be considered in isolation.”59  The Programme of Action that arose
out of the Cairo meeting recognized reproductive health as a human right
and recognized gender equality, empowerment of women, and equal ac-
cess to education for girls as sustainable development priorities.60  Schol-
ars and grassroots advocates continue to identify and strengthen linkages
between the reproductive justice movement and the environmental jus-
tice movement that preceded it.61
56 Loretta Ross, Understanding Reproductive Justice: Transforming the Pro-Choice
Movement, OFF OUR BACKS 14, no. 4, 2006, at 14.
57 SISTERSONG, supra note 55. R
58 Id. See also Joan C. Chrisler, Introduction: A Global Approach to Reproductive Jus-
tice—Psychosocial, and Legal Aspects and Implications, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1
(2013).
59 International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13,
1994, Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (1995), available at http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/
documents/publications/2004/icpd_eng.pdf.
60 See id. ¶ 1.1–1.15.
61 See Kristen Zimmerman & Vera Miao, Fertile Ground: Women Organizing at the
Intersection of Environmental Justice and Reproductive Justice, MOVEMENT STRATEGY CTR. 6
(2009), available at http:// fundcrservices.rnovementstrategy.org/a/wp-content/uploads/Fcr-
tileGround.pdf; Chinue Turner Richardson, Environmental Justice Campaigns Provide Fertile
Ground for Joint Efforts with Reproductive Rights Advocates, GUTTMACHER POL. REV., Winter
2006, at 14, 17, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/1/gpr090114.pdf ;
MOVEMENT STRATEGY CTR., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: GENDER, ORGANIZING, AND MOVEMENT
BUILDING AT THE INTERSECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 4
(2000), available at http://movementbuilding.movementstrategy.org/media/docs/9946_Fer-
tileGround_ExecSum.pdf; Angie McCarthy, On Fertile Ground: The Environmental and Re-
productive Justice Movements as a Unified Force for Reforming Toxic Chemical Regulation,
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Legal scholar Robin West’s urging of “a broader political argument
for reproductive justice in women’s lives that embraces, but does not
center upon, rights-based claims” explores many of the insights of the
reproductive justice movement.62  Her critique of Roe v. Wade and “the
various ‘choice-based’ arguments put forward by the pro-choice advo-
cacy community” suggests that although they have “secured for individu-
als a fairly robust constitutional right to legal abortion,” they have
simultaneously “ill served not only progressive politics broadly con-
ceived, but also have ill served women, both narrowly in terms of our
reproductive lives and needs, and more generally.”63  Progressive politics
and women themselves would be better served, West argues, by “putting
legal abortion in its place” in the context of a reproductive justice agenda
that “seek[s] greater justice for pregnant women who choose to carry
their pregnancies to term, working families, and struggling mothers.”64
Like the environmental justice movement, the reproductive justice
movement has struggled over the role of lawyers and other formally edu-
cated experts in defining and achieving social justice goals.65  Legal
scholar Sarah London’s analysis of this issue points to the ways in which
lawyers are implicated in the elitism challenged by each of the three
movements discussed in this Article.66  She suggests that the reproduc-
tive justice movement’s historical development as a critique from within
the reproductive rights movement shapes its response to lawyers’ in-
volvement.  The women of color who organize the reproductive justice
movement reject the lawyer-driven focus of the pro-choice movement on
a narrow legal right to abortion framed in terms of privacy.67  While
“[l]awyers have played a significant role in shaping the [reproductive
rights] movement’s agenda, in developing its strategy and in constricting
its rhetoric,” their role in the reproductive justice movement is necessa-
rily more marginal in light of the “disempowering effects” of lawyer-
centeredness and the government-centered strategies that lawyers tend to
favor.68
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, no. 1, 2012–2013, at 20; Sarah London, Reproductive Justice:
Developing a Lawyering Model, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71 (2011).
62 Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1396–97 (2009).
63 Id. at 1396.
64 Id. at 1427.  Rachel Rebouché has articulated a similar critique in her exploration of
the “gap between law and practice,” of the legal right to abortion in the South African context,
which “highlight[s] some of the limitations of decriminalization and liberalization agendas for
those advocating on behalf of reproductive rights.”  Rachel Rebouché, The Limits of Repro-
ductive Rights in Improving Women’s Health, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
65 See London, supra note 61. R
66 Id.
67 Id. at 85–88.
68 Id. at 83.
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Although reproductive justice advocates do not often rely explicitly
on health disparities data, access to health care and healthy living condi-
tions feature prominently among their priorities.  Access to health care—
not merely as a matter of the “right to choose” contraception or abortion,
but as a matter of the general affordability, availability, and cultural ap-
propriateness of a wide range of health services for women and fami-
lies—is a priority issue for the movement.  Additionally, advocates’
emphasis on “safe and healthy environments” for raising children en-
compasses access to clean air, water, and safe and healthy food as well as
health care, housing, education, employment, and other social determi-
nants of health.
D. Food Justice
Like the reproductive justice movement, the food justice move-
ment’s origins are linked to the seminal framework of the environmental
justice movement.  Robert Gottlieb and Anupama Joshi, authors of a re-
cent book on food justice, point to a key moment when food policy
scholars began to draw parallels between “environmental justice advo-
cacy and the approach of some emerging community food groups.”69
There is tension within the food justice movement, however, over the
centrality of economic and racial justice.  “The shift toward a new lan-
guage has not always been smooth” as groups seeking to reform indus-
trial food production have adopted the food justice framework.70  The
muddiness here may be attributable to the food justice movement’s occa-
sional conflation with the alternative food movement, which journalist
Michael Pollan has described as being “unified as yet by little more than
the recognition that industrial food production is in need of reform be-
cause its social/environmental/public health/animal welfare/gastronomic
costs are too high.”71  Legal scholar Rebecca Goldberg suggests that the
food justice movement might be understood as arising out of concerns
that the alternative food movement is elitist.72  “[W]ith its focus on farm-
ers’ markets and a do-it-yourself avoidance of processed food,” she
writes, “many of the food movement’s goals do seem aimed at those with
disposable income and disposable time.”73  In contrast, the food justice
69 ROBERT GOTTLIEB & ANUPAMA JOSHI, FOOD JUSTICE 4 (2010) (citing Robert Gottlieb
& Andy Fisher, Community Food Security and Environmental Justice: Converging Paths To-
wards Social Justice and Sustainable Communities, RACE, POVERTY & ENV’T, no. 2, 2000, at
18).
70 Id. at 7.
71 Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 10, 2010, avail-
able at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/food-movement-rising/.
72 Rebecca L. Goldberg, No Such Thing as a Free Lunch: Paternalism, Poverty, and
Food Justice, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35, 48–49 (2013).
73 Id. at 49.
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movement “focuses on the barriers that low-income or otherwise
marginalized groups face in realizing the goals of the broader food
movement, such as access to fresh, unprocessed food.”74
Christopher J. Curran and Marc-Tizoc González have gone consid-
erably further in centering their discussion of food justice on race.75
They suggest “that food justice be understood and practiced as interracial
justice,”76 pointing to urban farming as “the latest evolution in the long
struggle for interracial justice,” at least in one community.77  The story
they tell about urban farmers, community organizations, and the role of
government in the city of Oakland, California puts health disparities
front and center: “This broad movement for food justice has arisen due to
a deepening community health crisis; communities of color have long
faced disproportionate rates of cancer, diabetes, and illnesses associated
with lack of access to nutritious food and other forms of environmental
racism.”78  As legal scholars, Curran and González advocate for the use
of laws and policies (primarily at the local and state level) to support the
food justice movement’s response to this crisis.79  But they are careful to
note that some activists within the movement explicitly reject govern-
ment intervention in favor of community activism.80
Many definitions of food justice put health in the foreground.  For
example, Just Food (a nonprofit organization devoted to “[b]uilding a
just and sustainable food system” for New York City)81 proclaims that
“[f]ood justice is communities exercising their right to grow, sell, and eat
healthy food.”82  The group goes on to define “healthy” food in a way
that extends beyond a narrow conception of physical human health:
“Healthy food is fresh, nutritious, affordable, culturally-appropriate, and
grown locally with care for the well-being of the land, workers, and ani-
74 Id.
75 Christopher J. Curran & Marc-Tizoc González, Food Justice as Interracial Justice:
Urban Farmers, Community Organizations and the Role of Government in Oakland, Califor-
nia, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 207, 210 (2011) (noting that “without an express commit-
ment to anti-racism, and a multidimensional conceptualization of interracial justice that is
grounded in Oakland’s concrete locality and history, we fear and predict that food justice
efforts will likely exacerbate existing racial conflicts, as have so many prior laws and policies
that are bound by colorblindness or the nascent post-racial ideology.”).
76 Id. at 209.
77 Id. at 207.
78 Id.  Others have similarly pointed to the ways in which “food oppression” is a form of
structural racism. See, e.g., Andrea Freeman, Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition,
95 CAL. L. REV. 2221 (2007); Kate Meals, Nurturing the Seeds of Food Justice: Unearthing
the Impact of Institutionalized Racism on Access to Healthy Food in Urban African-American
Communities, 15 SCHOLAR 97 (2012).
79 See Curran & González, supra note 75, at 229–31. R
80 Id. at 230–31.
81 About Us, JUST FOOD, http://justfood.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
82 Food Justice, JUST FOOD, http://justfood.org/food-justice (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).
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mals.”83  The group also emphasizes the benefits of “[p]eople practicing
food justice” in terms of “a strong local food system, self-reliant commu-
nities, and a healthy environment.”84  In other definitions, health recedes
into the background as one of many concerns implicated by food sys-
tems.  Tim Lang and Michael Heasman have pointed to a wide range of
injustices in the food system, including “the maldistribution of food, poor
access to a good diet, inequities in the labour process and unfair returns
for key suppliers along the food chain.”85  Gottlieb and Joshi hold that
food justice seeks to “ensur[e] that the benefits and risks of where, what,
and how food is grown and produced, transported and distributed, and
accessed and eaten are shared fairly.”86  They describe the movement as
having “the potential to link different kinds of advocates, including those
concerned with health, the environment, food quality, globalization,
workers’ rights and working conditions, access to fresh and affordable
food, and more sustainable land use.”87  Goldberg has taken a different
approach altogether, describing the food justice movement as offering a
“narrative . . . regarding food in low-income communities” that she con-
trasts with the anti-hunger narrative on the one hand and the public
health anti-obesity narrative on the other.88
Goldberg points to the fact that scholars and lawyers are merely
catching up to grass roots activists.89  “For the food justice movement,
this grassroots activism generally takes the form of not-for-profit organi-
zations that work to give low-income neighborhoods access to the types
of food that are prized by the broader food movement—fresh, whole
food that is as divorced as possible from industrial production.”90  She
points out that “[s]uch groups . . . almost never speak in terms of obesity,
though some commentators see that as one underlying motivator.  They
speak instead about rights, equality, community empowerment, cultural
appropriateness, and, of course, justice.”91
II. LAW AS A TOOL FOR REDUCING HEALTH DISPARITIES
The interrelated social justice movements described in Part I have
all focused to some extent on reducing health disparities.  While few dis-
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 TIM LANG & MICHAEL HEASMAN, FOOD WARS: THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR MOUTHS,
MINDS AND MARKETS 8 (2004).
86 GOTTLIEB & JOSHI, supra note 69, at 6. R
87 Id. at 5.
88 Goldberg, supra note 72, at 40–55. R
89 Goldberg, supra note 72, at 50 (quoting Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The R
Legal Meaning of a Social Movement, 15 J.L. & COM. 597, 601 (1996)).
90 Id. at 50.
91 Id. at 50–51.
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pute this basic goal, lawmakers, scholars, and the general public are
deeply divided over the most appropriate means for achieving it.  Sharp
disagreement over our increasingly collective approach to financing
health care is spilling over into a national conversation about individual
versus collective responsibility for health in which social and cultural
biases are undeniably in evidence.92  While conservatives lambast the
Obama administration for expanding Medicaid eligibility beyond the
“deserving” poor, progressives argue that the administration is undermin-
ing its own health reform goals by gutting legal protections for individual
Medicaid recipients and providers.93  Anti-hunger groups are clashing
with public health advocates over proposals to restrict the use of nutrition
assistance benefits to purchase unhealthy food and beverage products.94
Nutrition and public health advocates have suggested that the opposition
of some civil rights groups to anti-obesity regulations can be explained
away by their financial ties to the soda industry.95
Before sketching out how the tension between individual and col-
lective responsibility for health can be productively and rigorously ex-
amined through a social justice lens in Part III, I will provide an
overview of the legal toolkit for reducing health disparities.  Policymak-
ers at every level of government are developing and implementing a di-
verse array of law and policy interventions for improving health
generally and reducing health disparities in particular.  Ensuring more
equitable access to health care has been the primary focus of these efforts
at the federal level.  Recognizing that access to medical care is far from a
complete response to health disparities, state and local governments have
pioneered innovative approaches for encouraging healthier behaviors and
creating healthier communities.  Some of these efforts explicitly target
low-income or minority communities.  Most are universally applicable,
but have a disparate impact on the poor or other socially disadvantaged
groups (whether by design or incidentally).  My aim in this Part is to
make the case for health law’s increasing emphasis on access to health
care and healthy living conditions, while also highlighting the many ten-
sions generated by this new focus.
92 See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Weighing Status: Obesity, Class, and
Health Reform, 89 OR. L. REV. 1113 (2011); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Social Psychology
of Limiting Healthcare Benefits for Undocumented Immigrants—Moving Beyond Race, Class,
and Nativism, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201 (2010); Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to
Health Care as an Incentive for Healthy Behavior? Assessing the Affordable Care Act’s Per-
sonal Responsibility for Wellness Reforms, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 641 (2014).
93 See Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting, and Payment Suits: How the
Obama Administration is Undermining Its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L.J. 771
(2012).
94 See infra Part II.B.
95 See infra Part II.C.
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A. Ensuring Access to Affordable, High-Quality Health Care
Universal access to health care has been the subject of intense polit-
ical debate in the United States for more than a hundred years.  While
many other industrialized countries adopted compulsory private insur-
ance systems or universal public insurance, U.S. progressives struggled
to eke out even the most modest reforms.96  High-profile federal propos-
als were defeated during the Progressive Era at the turn of the twentieth
century and again during the New Deal of the 1930s.97  Eventually,
Medicare (for the elderly and disabled) and Medicaid (for carefully de-
lineated categories of the “deserving” poor) were created as part of the
War on Poverty of the 1960s.98  Since the initiation of these programs,
there have been many (mostly unsuccessful) efforts to expand eligibility,
including proposals to adopt “Medicare for all” as a form of single-payer
health care.  But, as legal scholars Janet Dolgin and Katherine Dieterich
note,
[in our] competitive and uncertain socioeconomic set-
ting, large groups of Americans—especially those strug-
gling to sustain middle-class status—have long feared
that expanding health care coverage and extending it to
larger groups of people will blur the boundaries between
those at the lower reaches of the middle class and those
even less well-off.  The fear has not generally been di-
rectly or expressly acknowledged.99
In addition to bringing about a major expansion of health care cov-
erage for groups who were not well served by the private employer-
based system, the establishment of publically financed health care pro-
grams (particularly Medicare) gave the federal government powerful in-
fluence over the organization of the health care delivery system.100  The
Johnson administration took advantage of the infusion of federal money
into the health care system, coupled with Title VI’s prohibition on dis-
crimination by recipients of federal funding, to desegregate American
hospitals as a condition of participation in Medicare.101  But this impres-
96 See Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care Reform and Social Movements in the United States,
93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 75 (2003).
97 See id. at 76.
98 See id. at 77.
99 Dolgin & Dieterich, supra note 92, at 1116; see also Ed Sparer, Gordian Knots: The R
Situation of Health Care Advocacy for the Poor Today, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1 (1981)
(describing Medicaid and other progressive reform efforts as pitting the working class against
the very poor and calling for legal services advocates to use health law as a means to unite the
poor and working poor under a shared social cause).
100 See ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED
“FREE MARKET” HEALTHCARE (2013).
101 Watson, Section 1557, supra note 11, at 865. R
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sive effort left behind considerable racial segregation in nursing homes
and physician practices that persists to this day.102  Explicit, implicit, and
structural biases continue to shape the health care experiences of racial
and ethnic minorities and other socially and economically disadvantaged
people.  People of color, people with disabilities, and people with limited
means are less likely to have health insurance coverage and less likely to
receive needed medical care even if they do have coverage.103  The qual-
ity of care that they receive tends to be lower, they are subject to higher
rates of medical error, and their health outcomes suffer as a result.104
The misfit between the civil rights paradigm of assigning blame to
individual perpetrators of discrimination and the structural nature of
health care disparities has hampered the effectiveness of civil rights laws
in this context.  “[D]isparity issues are complex and may be deeply em-
bedded in providers’ actions and patients’ decisions, as well as in institu-
tional policies and practices.  Given this genesis, many disparities are
unlikely to be suitable to the approach required by civil rights laws.”105
Health law regulations aimed at improving access and quality for all
without explicitly targeting historically disadvantaged groups gradually
came to be seen as a more promising avenue for reducing disparities.106
In the 1980s and 1990s, health care providers and private health
plans were subjected to considerable regulation aimed at curtailing
widely reviled practices like patient dumping and exclusion of coverage
for pre-existing conditions.  The Emergency Medical Treatment and La-
bor Act of 1986107 (EMTALA) required that hospitals operating emer-
gency departments and accepting federal Medicare reimbursement to
provide screening and stabilizing treatment for emergency medical con-
ditions to all patients who come to the emergency room, regardless of
ability to pay.108  EMTALA created a safety net of last resort,109 obligat-
102 Id.
103 See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 2, at 3. R
104 Id.
105 SIDNEY WATSON, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, EQUITY MEASURES AND SYSTEMS RE-
FORM AS TOOLS FOR REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 3 (2005).
106 Id. (“The adoption of systems reform, which moves disparity-reduction efforts from
the civil rights arena into the world of health care quality regulation, may ease this
limitation.”).
107 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2013).
108 See W. David Koeninger, The Statute Whose Name We Dare Not Speak: EMTALA
and the Affordable Care Act, 16 J. RACE, GENDER & JUST. 139 (2013); see also Karen H.
Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26
HOUS. L. REV. 21 (1989).
109 The Affordable Care Act is expected to achieve major gains in health care coverage,
but there will still be around 30 million uninsured after full implementation. See Rachel
Nardin et al., The Uninsured After Implementation of the Affordable Care Act: A Demographic
and Geographic Analysis, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (June 6, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2013/06/06/the-uninsured-after-implementation-of-the-affordable-care-act-a-demographic-
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ing health care providers to provide treatment in cases where they deter-
mine that a patient’s symptoms are acute and severe enough “that the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to
result in placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy,
serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any
bodily organ or part.”110
In addition to the emergency care provided pursuant to EMTALA,
more routine charity care for those who lack sufficient health insurance
coverage is sometimes provided by nonprofit hospitals free of charge or
at a reduced price.  Charity care requirements were attached to federal
funding under the 1946 Hill Burton Act,111 and have been incorporated
into some community benefit requirements attached to the tax-exempt
status of nonprofit hospitals.  Community benefit requirements at the
state and federal level have been made somewhat more stringent in re-
cent years,112 but the care provided pursuant to these requirements is
negligible compared to community needs—to the extent that they might
fairly be characterized as largely symbolic.
The Health Insurance Portability and Affordability Act of 1996113
(HIPAA) prohibited private employer-based health plans from denying
coverage or imposing differential terms on individuals based on health-
related factors.  It also sharply limited the exclusion of coverage for pre-
existing conditions.  Combined with COBRA’s provision for temporary
extensions of coverage, HIPAA’s portability regulations provided con-
siderable protection for individuals and families who rely on employer-
based coverage.  Many states also adopted regulations curtailing private
health plan managed care practices like utilization review, limited pro-
vider networks, and provider payment arrangements that create incen-
tives for reducing care.114
HIPAA and COBRA helped those who receive health insurance as a
benefit of employment, state laws provided some additional protections
to those with private health insurance, and EMTALA provided for lim-
ited emergency care regardless of insurance status, but millions of Amer-
and-geographic-analysis/.  As a result, the last-resort safety net of mandated emergency care
continues to be quite relevant to health care access.
110 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (2013).
111 The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, P.L. 79-725, (commonly known
as the Hill-Burton Act) was enacted to provide federal financial assistance for the planning,
construction, and improvement of health care facilities through grants and guaranteed loans.
112 See MARTHA H. SOMERVILLE ET AL., HOSPITAL COMMUNITY BENEFITS AFTER THE
ACA (2013), available at http://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/
files/downloads/paper-somerville-et-al-Hilltop.pdf.
113 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181–1191c (1996).
114 See Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State
Managed Care Regulation, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2002).  With respect to self-in-
sured health plans, these state regulations are preempted by ERISA’s deemer clause.
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icans still struggled to obtain affordable, high-quality health insurance
and those left without it had a very difficult time accessing needed care.
In 2010, the Affordable Care Act deployed a combination of ambitious
private health insurance market reforms, subsidies for the purchase of
private insurance, and expanded Medicaid eligibility115 to move the
country closer to universal coverage.116
The ACA also included significant provisions to improve the qual-
ity of health care for all Americans, with a special emphasis on reducing
disparities.  Although a great deal of health care quality improvement
regulation takes place at the state level, federal conditions on Medicare
participation also play a hugely important role and the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services uses a wide range of tools to promote higher
quality care, particularly in hospitals.  The Affordable Care Act revital-
ized these efforts and focused them more explicitly on addressing
disparities.117
ACA reforms are supplemented by the Obama Administration’s ef-
forts to make reduction of health disparities a priority for federal agen-
cies.118  These efforts—which include development of the National
Partnership for Action to End Health Disparities,119 its National Stake-
holder Strategy for Achieving Health Equity,120 and the DHHS Action
115 The ACA, as drafted, would have required all states accepting Medicaid funds (which
is to say, all states) to expand Medicaid eligibility to millions of uninsured Americans who
were previously ineligible under federal law.  The provision is particularly important for non-
disabled, non-elderly adults who do not have dependent children (because they were not previ-
ously eligible at any income level), as well as for many non-disabled parents and older chil-
dren (who were previously covered only at extremely low income levels).  In NFIB v. Sebelius,
however, the Supreme Court held that the ACA’s penalty for states unwilling to expand Medi-
caid was unconstitutionally coercive. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012).  The result is that the expansion is entirely optional for states.  The expansion
remains a very attractive financial proposition for states, with the federal government picking
up 100% of the tab initially, phasing down to 90% over the course of a few years.  In our
divisive political climate, however, many Republican legislatures and governors declined the
expansion as a way of staking out their opposition to the President and the ACA.  The result is
that eligibility now varies even more dramatically from state to state than in the past, and many
poor, uninsured adults will be left without coverage.
116 Carter C. Price & Christine Eibner, For States that Opt Out of Medicaid Expansion:
3.6 Million Fewer Insured and $8.4 Billion Less in Federal Payments, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1030
(2012).
117 Majette, supra note 13, at 915. R
118 See id. at 926–27.
119 National Partnership for Action to End Health Disparities, Learn About the NPA, U.S.
DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 4, 2011, 8:44 A.M.), http://minorityhealth.hhs
.gov/npa/templates/browse.aspx?lvl=1&lvlid=11.
120 National Partnership for Action to End Health Disparities, National Stakeholder Strat-
egy for Achieving Health Equity, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Sept. 19,
2011, 10:35 A.M.), http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/npa/templates/content.aspx?lvl=1&lvlid=33
&ID=286.
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Plan to Reduce Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities121—parallel the ad-
ministration’s adoption of the environmental justice framework in many
ways.122
As the bedrock of health law efforts to ensure financial access to
health care for the poor, the Medicaid program warrants more detailed
discussion here.  The coverage provided by traditional Medicaid was de-
signed specifically to meet the needs of low-income families, offering
benefits like long-term care and dental care not typically covered by pri-
vate health plans.  Even as eligibility is expanding under the ACA, how-
ever, many advocates are expressing concern that the quality of coverage
is suffering from increased flexibility in federal requirements and state
budget cuts.123  At the same time, the rights of Medicaid beneficiaries are
being sharply curtailed by the courts.124
About one quarter of the U.S. population is covered by Medicaid or
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), a federally block-
granted adjunct to Medicaid.125  Unlike Medicare, which is entirely fed-
erally run, Medicaid and CHIP are funded and administered jointly by
121 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ACTION PLAN TO REDUCE RACIAL AND ETH-
NIC HEALTH DISPARITIES: A NATION FREE OF DISPARITIES IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
(2011), available at  http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/npa/files/Plans/HHS/HHS_Plan_complete
.pdf.
122 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MINORITY
HEALTH ACTIVITIES AS REQUIRED BY THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
(P.L. 111-148), at ii, available at http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/Assets/pdf/Checked/FINAL_
Report_to_Congress_on_Minority_Health_Activities_Nov_2013.pdf (noting that “[t]he HHS
Disparities Action Plan . . . leverages other national initiatives [including] the HHS Environ-
mental Justice Strategy.”).  The Obama administration has linked Affordable Care Act imple-
mentation (like environmental protection) to civil rights. See, e.g., Louise Radnofsky, Obama
Asks African-American Churches for Help with Health Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2013,
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/08/26/obama-asks-african-american-churches-for-help-
with-health-law/?KEYWORDS=health+law; Sam Baker, Sebelius Ties Healthcare Law to
Civil Rights Anniversary, THE HILL (Aug. 26, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/
health-reform-implementation/318861-sebelius-ties-healthcare-law-to-civil-rights-anniversary;
David Morgan, Sebelius Seeks Civil Rights Support for U.S. Healthcare Law, REUTERS (Apr.
12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/12/us-usa-healthcare-rights-idUSBRE83B1
O820120412.
123 Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431 (2011); Sara
Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduction
Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5 (2006); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federal-
ism” Approach to Medicaid, Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to
the States Harms Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973 (2001–2002).
124 See Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting, and Payment Suits: How the
Obama Administration Is Undermining Its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L.J. 771
(2012).
125 Medicaid Enrollment as a Percent of Total Population, FY2010, HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION (2010), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-enrollment-as-a-
of-pop/ (indicating Medicaid enrollment as of 2010 as 21% of the total U.S. population); DI-
ANE ROWLAND ET AL., MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP, (June 2013), available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?
a=v&pid=sites&srcid=bWFjcGFjLmdvdnxtYWNwYWN8Z3g6NWE3MTM2NWU4NjhhND
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the federal government and the states.  As such, they are governed by
relatively broad federal guidelines that give states considerable leeway to
determine the exact contours of eligibility and benefits.126  Through a
series of legislative reforms and readily granted administrative waiv-
ers,127 that flexibility has increased to the point where many states are
now shifting a large proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries into privatized
plans, complete with cost-sharing requirements and benefits that fall be-
low traditional Medicaid’s generous coverage.  Supporters argue that
privatization and flexibility will protect the economic viability of the
Medicaid program and may encourage more health care providers to ac-
cept Medicaid patients.
Opportunities for reform, experimentation, and advocacy on behalf
of Medicaid beneficiaries are uniquely shaped by the program’s joint
federal-state administrative structure.  Federal guidelines may constrain
state and local authorities interested in pioneering reforms.  In recent
years, however, DHHS has granted waiver requests quite liberally to al-
low states to experiment with incentives to reward patient compliance
and other healthy behaviors.  Citing health disparities, West Virginia,
Florida, and Idaho created incentive-based “wellness programs” in the
mid-2000s.128  A recent evaluation of these programs found that they had
little to no impact on improving health behaviors or outcomes for Medi-
caid beneficiaries.  Nonetheless, in late 2013, DHHS granted approval
for Iowa to implement a similar program.
Some progressive advocates have taken issue with incentive-based
programs, arguing that they inappropriately shift costs onto low-income
patients and put the onus on individuals and families to change their
health behaviors without necessarily making it easier for them to do so.
Particularly in the context of political controversy over the Medicaid eli-
gibility expansion, the rhetoric surrounding incentive-based reforms has
taken on a punitive tone.  For example, the governor of Idaho has indi-
cated that he would only consider expanding Medicaid eligibility if there
were some provision for “requir[ing] more personal responsibility and
better health outcomes.”129  The Governor’s statements indicate that he is
clearly contemplating a punitive approach:
VmYQ (providing enrollment numbers for 2013 that equate to 23% of the total U.S.
population).
126 See Huberfeld, supra note 123, at 447–48. R
127 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act gives the DHHS Secretary authority to waive
regulations with respect to approved experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects.  With a
§ 1115 waiver, a state may develop and implement new approaches to coverage that would
otherwise by prohibited under federal law. Id.
128 See Wiley, supra note 92. R
129 Audrey Dutton, Idaho Gov. Otter Wants More Personal Accountability in Medicaid,
IDAHO STATESMAN, May 30, 2013, http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/05/30/2595854/car
rots-and-sticks-for-medicaid.html.
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If you’re smoking, you gotta quit smoking. . . and if
you don’t quit smoking, some part of the benefit, or all
of it, goes away.
If you’ve got a history of diabetes in your family,
and you’re told to change a certain lifestyle, and you
don’t do it, then you don’t get [benefits] . . . anymore.130
Enforcement of federal spending program regulations can be quite
weak and the interests of beneficiaries are sometimes treated as collateral
to the power plays between the federal government and the states.  The
courts have approached these programs like quasi-contractual agree-
ments between the federal government as funder and the states as admin-
istrators.  The penalty for noncompliance with federal conditions on
acceptance and use of the funds is typically revocation of the funds.  In
the case of Medicaid, the only enforcement tool available to the federal
agency is total revocation—a blunt instrument that has occasionally been
threatened, but never deployed.
Historically, private advocates have played an important role in en-
forcing federal guidelines.131  But Medicaid beneficiaries seeking to liti-
gate against states to ensure compliance with federal law are facing ever-
mounting legal obstacles.  For example, federal Medicaid law mandates
that states must establish reimbursement rates for doctors and other
health care providers that are adequate to ensure that Medicaid recipi-
ents’ access to care is comparable to that of the general population.132
This purported comparability of access is, in reality, a farce.  But when
patients and health care providers have sought to enforce this and other
federal rules against states, they have encountered significant legal obsta-
cles.133  Initially, advocates found that § 1983 provided an avenue for
130 Id.
131 Federal litigation is a particularly important tool for Medicaid recipients because
“state administrative remedies are suited more for resolving individual Medicaid eligibility or
service issues than for challenging systemic agency policy or practices.”  Ann B. Lever &
Herbert A. Eastman, “Shake It Up in a Bag”: Strategies for Representing Beneficiaries in
Medicaid Litigation, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 863, 864 (1991).  For example, private parties sued
the Missouri program pursuant to § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause to get azidothymidine
(AZT) added to the Medicaid drug formulary for AIDS patients.  Gene P. Schultz & Charles
A. Parmenter, Medical Necessity, AIDS, and the Law, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 379
(1990).
132 Additionally, the ACA provided a temporary fee-for-service reimbursement rate in-
crease for physician-provided primary care services applicable in 2013 and 2014 in an effort to
encourage doctors to accept Medicaid enrollees as the expansion rolls out. KAISER COMM’N
ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, INCREASING MEDICAID PRIMARY CARE FEES FOR CERTAIN
PHYSICIANS IN 2013 AND 2014: A PRIMER ON THE HEALTH REFORM PROVISION AND FINAL
RULE (2012), available at  http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8397
.pdf.
133 See Ruqaiijah Yearby, Litigation, Integration & Transformation, Using Medicaid to
Address Racial Inequalities in Health Care, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 325 (2010).
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litigation with compensatory damages available.  Over time, however,
the Supreme Court has tightened the standards for when a § 1983 claim
may be brought to enforce Spending Clause legislation.134  Advocates
also turned to the Supremacy Clause (which allows for injunctive relief,
but not compensatory damages) as a basis for litigation, but that avenue
may also be narrowing.135
B. Encouraging Healthier Behavior Choices
Along with increasingly collective responsibility for ensuring access
to health care comes renewed interest in collective responsibility for “up-
stream” prevention of disease and injury as a strategy for reducing health
care costs, improving the public’s health and wellbeing, and reducing
health disparities.  Over the last couple of decades, public health law has
evolved from a narrow field focused primarily on “communicable dis-
ease law”136 to the “study of the legal powers and duties of the state to
assure the conditions for people to be healthy.”137  “New public
health”138 differs from “old public health”139 in its expanded focus on
non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as heart disease, stroke, and
diabetes and injuries, such as those caused by motor vehicle crashes,
drug overdoses, and firearms.  It also represents a major push beyond
education and communication campaigns urging people to make health-
ier choices.140  Experts and community groups have developed a host of
strategies for using law and policy tools to improve health behaviors
across the board, but particularly for socially and economically disadvan-
taged groups.
The use of law as a tool for changing health-related behaviors en-
compasses long-standing measures like vaccination mandates as well as
134 Id.
135 See Steven Clark, At Risk Patients and Doctors: Why Increased Agency Enforcement
and Private Causes of Action Under the Supremacy Clause are Needed to Protect Medicaid
Providers and Beneficiaries, 101 KY. L.J. 183 (2012); Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S.
Ct. 1204 (2012) (declining to decide whether Medicaid beneficiaries and providers can chal-
lenge a state law in federal court on the basis that it violates the federal Medicaid Act and
therefore is “preempted” by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, on the grounds
that the issue should be reheard by the Ninth Circuit in light of DHHS approval of the chal-
lenged state law).
136 Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s Health:
A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59,  62 (1999).
137 GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 17. R
138 See Wiley, supra note 92. R
139 See Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: In Defense of the “Old”
Public Health, 46 PERSPS. BIOLOGY & MED. S128 (2003).
140 See Wiley, supra note 92, at 219–25 (comparing the communication- and education- R
focused “behavioral model” that dominated public health in the second half of the twentieth
century with the “ecological model”—emphasizing the social, environmental, and cultural fac-
tors that influence health behaviors—that is the focus of new public health).
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more recent applications like seat-belt laws, smoking bans, and excise
taxes.  These measures tend to be universally applicable, but they often
have a disproportionate impact on socially disadvantaged groups.
Whether that disparate impact is a good thing or a bad thing can be
difficult to tease out.  For example, acceptance of childhood vaccinations
is actually higher among low-income families than among the well-to-
do.141  The protection afforded by immunization is certainly a good
thing, but to the extent that wealthy parents who perceive vaccinations as
risky and have the wherewithal to opt out of mandates are free-riding on
herd immunity supported by the actions of lower-income parents, there
may be a significant fairness problem.  In another example, studies eval-
uating the impact of making failure to wear a seat belt a primary offense
(meaning that seat-belt use alone is a legitimate basis for a traffic stop)
have found that primary enforcement is associated with a disproportion-
ate increase in seat-belt use among African-Americans.142  The research-
ers lauded this as a positive strategy for reducing long-standing
disparities in seat-belt use (and fatality rates for motor vehicle crashes)
among African-Americans.  But that framing elides the deeply concern-
ing reasons that primary enforcement has a particularly strong influence
on black drivers and passengers.143  Indeed, civil liberties and anti-dis-
crimination groups have opposed primary enforcement reforms, based on
concerns about racial bias in traffic stops.144  Tobacco control laws have
successfully “denormalized” smoking as a socially acceptable behavior,
turning the tide against one of the leading risk factors for premature
death and illness.  But some advocates question whether stigmatization
continues to be an appropriate strategy in light of widening social dispar-
ities between people with higher incomes and more formal education
(among whom smoking rates have declined most rapidly) and those with
lower incomes and less formal education (who make up an increasingly
disproportionate share of the 18% of Americans who are current smok-
141 Total lack of vaccination is more common among children who are non-Hispanic
white, whose mothers are older and have received more formal education, and who come from
households earning more than $75,000.  Undervaccination—receipt of some, but not all rec-
ommended vaccinations—remains a persistent problem among low-income families.  P.J.
Smith et al., Children Who Have Received No Vaccines: Who Are They and Where Do They
Live?, 114 PEDIATRICS 187, 189 (2004).
142 Nathaniel C. Briggs et al., Seat Belt Law Enforcement and Racial Disparities in Seat
Belt Use, 31 AM J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 135 (2006).
143 Id. at 139 (noting that researchers in two studies finding that primary enforcement has
a disparate impact on seat belt use among African Americans “attributed findings to a percep-
tion among blacks of an increased likelihood of being ticketed for seat belt law violations in
primary-law states because of the potential for differential enforcement”).
144 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOCU-
MENTING HOW STATES RECENTLY UPGRADED TO PRIMARY SEAT BELT LAWS (2011).
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ers).145  These and many other examples illustrate the “[g]enuine ambiv-
alence about obliterating disparities in health and socioeconomic status
[that] underlies ‘prevention’ efforts.”146
Because NCDs associated with unhealthy eating habits are a pri-
mary driver of death, disability, and health disparities, law and policy
interventions for promoting healthy eating merit special attention here.
Justice Scalia famously warned that if the government can force people
to buy health insurance, there is nothing to stop it from forcing them to
buy broccoli as well.147  So far, no one has seriously proposed an “eat
your vegetables” mandate, but state and local governments are pursuing
a wide range of strategies to make healthy choices easier and unhealthy
choices harder, including subsidization of fresh produce and taxation of
harmful products.148  The ACA itself includes a calorie-labeling mandate
for restaurant menu items, which was first pioneered by local and state
governments.149
Like tobacco taxes, “soda taxes,” whereby state and local govern-
ments either impose a special tax on sugar sweetened beverages or sim-
ply revoke the regular sales tax exemption that applies to other food and
beverage sales, have been adopted by several state and city govern-
ments.150  But the tide appears to be turning against these measures,
driven by “controversy over their effectiveness, their impact on the poor,
145 See Kirsten Bell et al., Smoking, Stigma and Tobacco ‘Denormalization’: Further Re-
flections on the Use of Stigma as a Public Health Tool. A Commentary on Social Science &
Medicine’s Stigma, Prejudice, Discrimination and Health Special Issue, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED.
795, 795 (2010) (suggesting that “stigmatizing smoking will not ultimately help to reduce
smoking prevalence amongst disadvantaged smokers — who now represent the majority of
tobacco users.  Rather, it is likely to exacerbate health-related inequalities by limiting smokers’
access to healthcare and inhibiting smoking cessation efforts in primary care settings”).  It may
also be the case that social disparities are what make the use of shame-based interventions
politically feasible in the first place. See Ronald Bayer & Jennifer Stuber, Tobacco Control,
Stigma, and Public Health: Rethinking the Relations, 26 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 47, 49 (2006)
(noting that states with aggressive antismoking campaigns began to “embrace a strategy of
denormalization” only after “the social class composition of smokers underwent a dramatic
shift downward”).
146 Dolgin & Dieterich, supra note 92, at 1139. R
147 James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/business/how-broccoli-be
came-a-symbol-in-the-health-care-debate.html?_r=0.
148 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Manel Kappagoda & Anne Pearson, Public Health Law:
Healthy and Unhealthy Behaviors, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW (Glenn
Gohen, Allison Hoffman & William Sage eds., forthcoming 2014) (describing the public
health law toolkit for influencing health behaviors through environmental changes).
149 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-1448, § 4205, 124 Stat.
119, 573–576 (2010) (requiring restaurants to disclose calorie counts on menus).
150 Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Assessing Laws and Legal Authorities for Obesity Preven-
tion and Control, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 31 (Supp. 1 2009).
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general aversion to increased taxes,”151 as well as a well-financed lobby-
ing campaign by the beverage industry.152  The regressive nature of ex-
cise taxes has been noted ruefully by public health advocates,153 but they
argue that the disproportionate financial burden of these taxes on the
poor is outweighed by their disproportionate benefit in addressing high
consumption of tobacco, sugary drinks, and the like (and associated dis-
parities in health problems like lung cancer and diabetes) among low-
income and nonwhite communities.
Several state and local policymakers have expressed interest in a
more targeted approach: restricting the use of Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP, but better known as “food stamps”) benefits
151 Judith A. Monroe et al., Legal Preparedness for Obesity Prevention and Control: A
Framework for Action, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 18 (Supp. 1 2009).
152 New soda tax proposals since 2010 have overwhelmingly met with political defeat,
and some states have even repealed previously adopted taxes.  Joey Peters, Soda Taxes Fizzle
in Wake of Industry Lobbying, WASH. POST, Jul. 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071303494.html; Duff Wilson & Janet Roberts,
Special Report: How Washington Went Soft on Childhood Obesity, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/us-usa-foodlobby-idUSBRE83Q0ED20120427 (re-
porting that during the past two years, each of the twenty-four states and five cities that consid-
ered “soda taxes” to discourage consumption of sugary drinks has seen the efforts dropped or
defeated); but see Caroline Scott-Thomas, D.C. Council Approves Soda Tax, FOOD NAVIGA-
TOR USA (May 28, 2010), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Regulation/D.C.-Council-ap
proves-soda-tax (noting that the Washington, D.C. Council approved a measure including
sweetened soft drinks in its six percent sales tax bracket in May of 2010).  A new federal tax
on sugar-sweetened beverages was proposed as part of health reform efforts in 2009, but the
proposal was dropped after lobbying from the beverage industry.  Tom Hamburger & Kim
Geiger, Beverage Industry Douses Tax on Soft Drinks, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, http://articles
.latimes.com/2010/feb/07/nation/la-na-soda-tax7-2010feb07.
153 Critics of so-called “sin taxes” point out that the taxes are regressive in that they are
assessed at a fixed rate, without regard to ability to pay, and that fixed rate makes up a much
larger share of income for the poor than for the wealthy. See Matthew C. Farrelly et al., The
Consequences of High Cigarette Excise Taxes for Low-Income Smokers, PLOSONE  (Sept. 12,
2012), http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0043838;
Jendi B. Reiter, Citizens or Sinners? The Economic and Political Inequity of “Sin Taxes” on
Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443 (1996).  Sales taxes in
general are quite regressive—the poor spend an average rate of 7% of their income on sales
taxes, while those with middle incomes pay a 4.6% rate and the wealthiest taxpayers pay less
than 1%.  For excise taxes in particular, the rates are even more regressive, with low-income
households paying a share of their income that is sixteen times greater than that paid by the
wealthiest.  INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND ECON. POL’Y, WHO PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANAL-
YSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 2 (2013). Popular support for taxes on sugary
beverages declined sharply from 2010 to 2012, largely in response to heavy campaigns by
industry groups that emphasized their impact on low- and middle-income communities and
minorities. See 63% Oppose “Sin Taxes” on Junk Food and Soda, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (May
6, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/may_
2012/63_oppose_sin_taxes_on_junk_food_and_soda; Daniel Zingale, Gulp! The High Cost of
Big Soda’s Victory, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/09/opinion/
la-oe-zingale-soda-tax-campaign-funding-20121209.
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as an anti-obesity intervention.154  Some proposals would prohibit the
use of SNAP benefits for particular items, such as sugary drinks or
candy.155  Others would go farther, limiting SNAP recipients to a speci-
fied list of healthy products that excludes many staples of the American
diet, including meat, white potatoes, white rice, pasta, and flour
tortillas.156
These proposals have prompted a significant rift between public
health and nutrition advocates, who largely favor restrictions,157 and anti-
hunger and poverty groups, who vehemently oppose them.  Pro-restric-
tion nutrition and public health advocates point to financial ties between
anti-hunger groups like FRAC and the food and beverage industry, sug-
154 In June of 2013, as major cuts to SNAP were being debated in Congress, New York
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and seventeen other mayors of large cities sent a letter to
House leaders urging them to allow local governments to “test and evaluate approaches limit-
ing SNAP’s subsidization of products, such as sugar-sweetened beverages, that are contribut-
ing to obesity.”  Ralph Becker et al., SNAP Letter to House, SCRIBD (June 18, 2013), http://
www.scribd.com/doc/148590000/SNAP-Letter-to-House-6-18-13.
155 In 2004, for example, USDA denied a request from the state of Minnesota to waive
federal regulations and allow the state to prohibit the purchase of candy and soda with food
stamp benefits.  Letter from Ollice C. Holden, Regional Administrator, Food Stamp Program,
Food and Nutrition Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to Maria Gomez, Assistant Comm’r, Econ. and
Cmty. Support Strategies, Minn. Dep’t of Human Services. (May 4, 2004), available at http://
heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/15364.pdf.  In 2010,
New York City requested a waiver to ban the use of SNAP benefits for the purchase of high-
sugar, low-nutrient beverages, which USDA also denied.  Memorandum from Food and Nutri-
tion Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, to Elizabeth Berlin, Exec. Deputy Comm’r, N.Y. State
Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (Aug. 19, 2011), available at http://www.food-
politics.com/wp-content/uploads/SNAP-Waiver-Request-Decision.pdf.
156 In 2013, policymakers in South Carolina and Wisconsin announced plans to restrict
SNAP recipients to the approved foods list used for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Pro-
gram for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC).  Dylan Scott, Wisconsin, South Carolina Hope
to Make Food-Stamp Purchases Healthier, GOVERNING (May 7, 2013), http://www.governing
.com/blogs/view/gov-should-states-limit-what-foods-are-purchased-with-food-stamps.html.
The current WIC food packages restrict eligible purchases to: breakfast cereal; milk, cheese,
tofu, and soy-based beverages; fruits, vegetables, and legumes; peanut butter; canned fish;
whole wheat breads and other whole grains; juice; eggs; baby formula; and baby food.  Eligi-
ble foods within each of these categories are subject to more specific federal guidelines.  For
example, eligible breakfast cereals must contain minimum amounts of iron and whole grains
and may not exceed maximum amounts of sugar and fat.  The only eligible beverages are milk,
soy milk (containing required amounts of calcium and protein and meeting specific fortifica-
tion guidelines), and 100% juice (unsweetened and containing specified amounts of vitamin
C).  Lindsay F. Wiley, The U.S. Department of Agriculture as a Public Health Agency?: A
“Health in All Policies” Case Study, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 61 (2013).
157 See AM. MED. ASS’N, MEMORIAL RESOLUTIONS 14 (June 2013), http://www.ama-assn
.org/assets/meeting/2013a/a13-resolutions.pdf (resolution to “support modifying federal guide-
lines for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to eliminate sugar-sweetened
beverages and consumption of high-density caloric foods”); Michael Pollan, Farmer In Chief,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 12, 2008, at MM62, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/
magazine/12policy-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“It makes no sense for government food-
assistance dollars, intended to improve the nutritional health of at-risk Americans, to support
the consumption of products we know to be unhealthful.”).
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gesting that their opposition to restrictions is insincere and should not be
taken seriously.158  Anti-restriction groups point out that the food
purchases of SNAP beneficiaries are, if anything, slightly healthier than
those of non-participants, in spite of the difficulties that many low-in-
come people have in accessing fresh and appealing produce.159  They
argue that pro-restriction policymakers are simply “attacking poor peo-
ple,”160  Indeed, the rhetoric of some pro-restriction lawmakers echoes
Regan-era complaints about “welfare queens” driving Cadillacs and
“strapping young bucks” using food stamps to buy T-bone steaks.161  In
some cases SNAP restriction proposals have been made as part of
broader efforts to cut down on consumption of sugary drinks and un-
healthy foods for all consumers.  But in many jurisdictions, policymakers
who sharply oppose universally applicable food and beverage regulations
have simultaneously supported special restrictions that target the poor.162
C. Creating Healthier Communities
The “social-ecological” model of public health points to various
strategies for facilitating healthier living through changes to our neigh-
158 MICHELE SIMON, EAT, DRINK, POLITICS, FOOD STAMPS: FOLLOW THE MONEY 12
(2012), available at  http://www.eatdrinkpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/FoodStampsFol-
lowtheMoneySimon.pdf.
159 Id.
160 Mark Bittman, Regulating Our Sugar Habit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, http://opi-
nionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/regulating-our-sugar-habit/.
161 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19krugman.html (describing Reagan campaign
speeches in southern states referencing the legendary Cadillac-driving “welfare queen” and the
Food Stamp-using “strapping young buck” buying “T-bone steaks”); Katie Sanders, Ronda
Storms’ Food Stamp Law Affects Cash Assistance Too, POLITIFACT FLORIDA (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://www.politifact.com/florida/article/2012/feb/10/ronda-storms-food-stamp-law/ (detailing
statements by the sponsor of a Florida bill to restrict the use of SNAP benefits for sugary and
salty snacks and to prohibit withdrawals from cash assistance programs at strip clubs, casinos,
and bars); Editorial, Food Stamp Food Police?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012,http://articles.la
times.com/2012/jan/31/opinion/la-ed-foodstamps-20120131 (comparing the same Florida leg-
islator to Marie Antoinette).
162 As a legal matter, of course, this inconsistency is explained by government’s special
authority to determine how public funds are used. See, e.g.,Scott, supra 156 (quoting Wiscon- R
sin State Rep. Dean Kaufert as saying that “These food stamps are supposed to go toward
making sure there’s nutritious food in the cupboards for families that are struggling.  That was
the original intent . . . I don’t want to be big government, big nanny state, but the difference is
that these are tax dollars.”).  The rhetoric used illustrates how the “logic [of the private/public
distinction] has obscured how law structures dependency and the distribution of life chances
such that certain populations, such as welfare recipients, women, and people with disabilities
are constructed as forgoing their right to privacy because they cannot meet arbitrary norms of
independence that hide the forces that subsidize and support the lives of white men, high wage
earners and the wealthy, and people constructed as able-bodied.” Spade, supra note 36, at R
1088.
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borhoods, schools, workplaces, and marketplaces.163  Like behavior-fo-
cused interventions, the growing popularity of community-focused
interventions reveals “the public’s interest in the question of whether and
how government might influence the diets [and other health-determi-
nants] of low-income communities.”164  This particular attention to the
needs of the poor has potential to bring about meaningful improvements
to their living conditions, but it also generates tension over concerns
about fairness and cultural bias.
Federal efforts in this regard have been directed at increasing the
health focus of existing federal programs.  For example, the Healthy,
Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010165 introduced sweeping changes to the
school food environment, not only for the millions of kids receiving free
or reduced meals at breakfast and lunch, but for all students who
purchase food, whether in à la carte lines in the food service area, at a
school store, or in vending machines.  In a few fairly limited instances,
however, federal legislation has reached beyond existing areas of federal
involvement to nationalize approaches pioneered by state and local gov-
ernments.  For example, the ACA adopted a calorie-labeling mandate for
restaurant menu items,166 which had been pioneered by the City of New
York and several other state and local governments.  The ACA also in-
cluded regulations to facilitate breastfeeding in workplaces,167 and grants
to fund other community-level prevention strategies.168
The community strategy has been most successful at the state and
local level.  Some cities have specifically targeted particular neighbor-
hoods for these efforts.  In 2008, for example, the Los Angeles City
Council approved a moratorium on permits for any new fast food restau-
rants in a thirty-two-square-mile area of the city.169  The ordinance was
163 See, e.g., KAREN GLANZ ET. AL., HEALTH BEHAVIOR AND HEALTH EDUCATION: THE-
ORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 470 (2008) (“Ecological models specify that factors at multi-
ple levels, often including intrapersonal, interpersonal, organizational, community, and public
policy, can influence health behaviors.  Concepts that cut across these levels include sociocul-
tural factors and physical environments, which may apply to more than one level.”); NANCY
ADLER ET AL., Inst. of Med., Building the Science for a Population Health Movement (2013)
(experts “view health as the product of multiple determinants at the biologic, genetic, behav-
ioral, social, and environmental levels and their interactions among individuals, communities,
time, and place”).
164 Goldberg, supra note 72, at 59. R
165 Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C, and 42 U.S.C.).
166 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-1448, § 4205, 124 Stat.
119, 573–576 (2010) (requiring restaurants to disclose calorie counts on menus).
167 Id. at § 4207 (requiring employers to provide adequate break time and facilities for
nursing mothers).
168 Id. at § 4201 (establishing community transformation grants).
169 The moratorium, adopted via an Interim Control Ordinance, applies to the South Los
Angeles, Southeast Los Angeles, West Adams, Baldwin Hills, and Leimert Park community
planning areas.  The ordinance defines a fast food restaurant as “[a]ny establishment which
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expressly intended to “address the over-concentration of [land] uses
which are detrimental to the health and welfare of the people of the com-
munity.”170  The designated area was purportedly selected based on data
regarding its especially high concentration of fast food restaurants.  But
commentators have been quick to note that it also encompasses predomi-
nantly low-income, minority communities with a higher incidence of
obesity than the city as a whole.171  The ordinance has generated tension
over the propriety of singling out socially disadvantaged groups for pa-
ternalistic intervention.172  A few jurisdictions have explored similar
zoning strategies,173 while others have implemented subsidies to promote
the availability of healthier food marketplaces in particular
neighborhoods.174
Most strategies for creating healthier communities have been
broadly applicable, but with a potentially disproportionate impact on so-
cially disadvantaged groups.  For example, product safety and nutrition-
focused regulations run the risk of disproportionately harming the poor
by pricing them out of certain markets.  On the other hand, there is a
concern that some public health interventions—such as calorie labeling
on restaurant menus or nutrition labeling on packaged foods—are prob-
lematic precisely because they are less likely to be effective for consum-
ers who lack formal education or the financial resources to make
purchasing decisions based on factors other than price.
New York City’s proposed prohibition on the sale of sugar sweet-
ened beverages at food service establishments in containers larger than
dispenses food for consumption on or off the premises, and which has the following character-
istics: a limited menu, items prepared in advance or prepared or heated quickly, no table or-
ders, and food served in disposable wrapping or containers.” L.A., Cal., Ordinance 180103
(July 29, 2008).
170 Id.
171 See Goldberg, supra note 72, at 55–56. R
172 Id. at 57 (“Writing in 2008, William Saletan accused the Los Angeles City Council of
‘depicting poor people, like children, as less capable of free choice,’ and called the original
moratorium ‘a disturbingly paternalistic way of solving the problem’ of unequal food options
between low-income neighborhoods and wealthier neighborhoods.”).
173 Lisa M. Feldstein, Zoning and Land Use Controls: Beyond Agriculture, 65 ME. L.
REV. 467 (2013) (“Framed variously as an environmental justice, civil rights, and health equity
issue, utilizing zoning to promote more equitabl[y] built environments in low-and higher-in-
come neighborhoods has found broad support amongst advocates as well as public health and
planning professionals.”).  Many local governments have imposed zoning restrictions on fast-
food establishments that are justified in terms of aesthetic values.  Other have adopted restric-
tions that target schoolchildren.  Phoenix has banned mobile street vendors within 600 feet of
schools during school hours.  Detroit similarly banned the opening of new fast food restaurants
within 500 feet of schools. See Paul Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for
Obesity Prevention: How Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 91 (2011).
174 Id. at 91.
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sixteen ounces175 generated enormous public controversy and was re-
cently invalidated by the New York Court of Appeals on the grounds that
enacting such a rule was the province of the City Council, not the Board
of Health.176  Autonomy concerns about the portion rule dominated the
public discourse,177 but equity concerns about its disproportionate impact
on low-income people and people of color also played an important role.
Among the named plaintiffs challenging the portion rule were two
associations of minority-run businesses.178  The New York State Confer-
ence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and the Hispanic Federation179 filed an amicus brief arguing
that the portion rule “arbitrarily discriminates against citizens and small
business owners in African-American and Hispanic communities.”180
Noting that “[s]oft drinks are bought by one-third of the poorest 2 million
New Yorkers, but only one-sixth of the richest 1 million,”181 the NAACP
and the Federation argued that the portion rule “disproportionately af-
fects freedom of choice in low-income communities,”182 and pointed to
the “threatened disparate impact on minority-owned businesses.”183
Both groups have spoken strongly in favor of education-only solutions to
175 While some might classify the portion rule as a behavioral intervention, I believe it is
more properly understood as a social-ecological intervention aimed at making restaurants more
conducive to healthy consumption habits.
176 N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health
& Mental Hygiene, No. 134, 2014 WL 2883881 (N.Y. Ct. App. June 26, 2014).
177 To be clear, the anti-paternalism argument against the portion rule is not a legal argu-
ment.  Lindsay F. Wiley, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms, and the Law: The Nor-
mative Impact of Product Configuration Bans, 47 CONN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014) draft
available through http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2460866 (“In cases
where a fundamental right or suspect classification is implicated, a purely paternalistic govern-
ment interest may not be sufficiently compelling to justify infringement pursuant to strict scru-
tiny.  But there is no fundamental right to sell or purchase particular products or services in
particular configurations.” (citations omitted)).
178 Named plaintiffs included a statewide coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
and an association of Korean-American grocers.
179 The Hispanic Federation is “a network of nearly 100 Latino-serving organizations
throughout the northeast United States.  The organization’s mission is to empower and ad-
vance the Hispanic community.”  Brief for the New York State Conference of the NAACP &
the Hispanic Federation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, In re N.Y. Statewide
Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 110
A.D.3d 1 (2013) (No. 653584/2012) [hereinafter NAACP Amici Brief].
180 Id. at 8.
181 Id. at 3 (quoting Brian Wansink, How Bloomberg’s Soft Drink Ban Will Backfire on
NYC Public Health, THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/
archive/2012/06/how-bloombergs-soft-drink-ban-will-backfire-on-nyc-public-health/258501/).
182 Id. at 2.
183 Id. at 3; see also Hazel N. Dukes, Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Ban: Short-Sighted and
Misdirected, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hazel-n-
dukes/ny-sodaban_b_1834816.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-1\CJP102.txt unknown Seq: 37  9-OCT-14 12:08
2014] HEALTH LAW AS SOCIAL JUSTICE 83
the obesity crisis.184  The education-only approach has been deemed ut-
terly inadequate by public health experts, but it is frequently touted by
the food and beverage industries (like the tobacco, automobile, and other
industries before them) seeking to shift the blame away from unhealthy
products toward “personal responsibility.”185  Indeed, public health and
nutrition advocates have suggested that the involvement of civil rights
groups in anti-obesity policy debates has been tainted by a financial ties
between civil rights groups and the food and beverage industry.186
There is widespread agreement that health disparities are troubling.
But, as illustrated by the examples described here, interventions to re-
duce disparities can generate considerable tensions between the goals of
health promotion and social justice and between the notions of personal
and collective responsibility.  As our increasingly collective approach to
health care financing prompts greater public interest in upstream preven-
tion, these tensions are likely to grow.  They warrant rigorous examina-
tion from a variety of perspectives.
III. HEALTH JUSTICE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR
REDUCING HEALTH DISPARITIES
Do the developments described in Part II suggest a “health justice”
movement similar to the environmental, reproductive, and food justice
movements described in Part I?  Although the label “health justice” has
not yet gained much traction,187 simultaneous social, lawyering, and
184 See NAACP Amici Brief, supra note 179, at 4 (pointing to the NAACP’s development R
of a program called “Project HELP (Healthy Eating, Lifestyles, and Physical Activity),” which
“is designed to improve the overall quality of life for African-Americans through health educa-
tion, focusing on educating participants on the risk factors that lead to chronic diseases, includ-
ing obesity, diabetes, hypertension, stroke, and cardiovascular disease.”). See also Jose
Calderon, Obesity Demands Our Attention, FOX NEWS LATINO (July 3, 2012), http://la-
tino.foxnews.com/latino/health/2012/07/03/jose-calderon-education-to-preventobesity/.
185 See Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism and Public
Health in the Age of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 89 (2013).
186 See, e.g., Michael Grynbaum, In NAACP, Industry Gets Ally Against Soda Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/nyregion/fight-over-bloombergs-
soda-ban-reaches-courtroom.html (reporting on NAACP’s close ties to big soda companies,
pointing out that the amicus brief was submitted by King & Spaulding, Coca-Cola’s “long-
time Atlanta law firm.”  Moreover, when asked about the NAACP’s position on this issue, the
state conference referred those questions to the American Beverage Association, which in turn
referred questions to Coca-Cola.); Nancy Huehnergarth, How Big Soda Co-Opted the NAACP
and Hispanic Federation, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
nancy-huehnergarth/minorities-soda-lobby_b_2541121.html (citing donations amounting to
more than $2 million to the NAACP and various state conferences over the past twenty-five
years).
187 The label has been used only occasionally, most notably by a handful of advocacy
groups, a law school clinic at Loyola Chicago based on the medical-legal partnership model,
and Sridhar Venkatapuram, one of several political philosophers exploring the relationship
between health and social justice. See VENKATAPURAM, supra note 15; The Praxis Project, R
HEALTHJUSTICE, http://www.healthjustice.us/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (offering “resources to
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scholarly movements focusing on health disparities, the social determi-
nants of health, and the relationships between health and social justice
are certainly underway.
In spite of the growing influence of these movements (those that are
specific to health as well as those in related areas), the social justice
framework is sometimes assumed, but rarely discussed in health law
scholarship.  Many attempts to conceptualize health law’s burgeoning
commitment to reducing health disparities are unified by a dominant em-
phasis on expanding access to health care through the recognition of in-
dividual patient rights—an approach that may actually be counter to
lessons drawn from the environmental, reproductive, and food justice
movements and from the work of political philosophers and ethicists in-
terested in health justice.  In this Part, I sketch out the contours of the
health justice lens, presenting it as a distinct alternative to the libertarian
market justice of the “market competition” paradigm, but also to the pro-
gressive market justice of the “patient-rights” paradigm.188
A. What Is Health Justice?
The Praxis Project, which describes itself as a nonprofit intermedi-
ary providing support for organizing and change work at local, regional,
and national levels, has organized its work on environmental justice,
food justice, and health care access, under the label of “health justice.”
Praxis defines health justice broadly, with an emphasis on the social de-
terminants of health, fighting cultural bias, and promoting health at the
community level:
A community’s health is as much the result of insti-
tutional policies and practice as it is personal choice.
support organizing and policy advocacy to advance health justice in your community”); Mis-
sion, ACCESS WOMEN’S HEALTH JUSTICE, http://accesswhj.org/mission (last visited Apr. 3,
2014) (describing the work of a reproductive justice organization that has adopted “health
justice” as part of its identity); Beazley School of Law Institute for Health Law and Policy,
Health Justice Project, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO, http://www.luc.edu/law/centers/heal-
thlaw/hjp/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (“The Health Justice Project was founded by
Professor Emily Benfer in the summer of 2010 and is a medical-legal partnership clinic be-
tween Loyola University Chicago School of Law and Erie Family Health Center, a Federally
Qualified Health Center that serves over 40,000 low-income patients annually.  Students of
law, social work, public health and medicine enrolled in the clinic engage in interprofessional
collaboration to identify and address social and legal issues that negatively affect the health of
low-income individuals.”).  The medical-legal partnership model is part of a broader move-
ment to incorporate a wide range of social services and assistance into health-care clinical
settings, exemplified by the work of nonprofit organizations like Health Leads. See Our Vi-
sion, HEALTH LEADS, https://healthleadsusa.org/what-we-do/our-vision/ (last visited June 23,
2014).
188 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing patient rights and market com- R
petition as the currently dominant health law paradigms); supra notes 26–36 and accompany-
ing text (contrasting libertarian market justice with progressive market justice).
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Which communities have fresh, nutritious food?  Where
do governments allow dumping?  Who is more often
targeted by advertisers with unhealthy products?  Which
communities have state-of-the-art medical facilities?
Which ones don’t?
All of these factors (or social determinants) are
symptoms of the bias and privilege that shape virtually
every aspect of our lives.  It is no secret that across
nearly every indicator of health status, poor people and
people of color are more likely to be sick, injured, or die
prematurely . . . .  It will take organizing from the
ground up; social change that transforms the current sys-
tems of neglect, bias, and privilege into systems—poli-
cies, practices, institutions—that truly support health[y]
communities for all.  That’s health justice.189
In addition to growing interest in health justice among community
groups, the last several years have seen an upsurge in scholarly interest
among political philosophers and ethicists in “the bearing of justice on
health, and the practical normative implications of the relationships be-
tween health and society.”190  Sridhar Venkatapuram, Dan Beauchamp,
Norman Daniels, Bruce Jennings, Madison Powers and Ruth Faden, Jen-
nifer Prah Ruger, Shlomi Segall, and Kristin Voigt have explored these
implications by drawing on Rawls’ theory of justice,191 the capabilities
189 The Praxis Project, supra note 187. R
190 JOHN COGGON, WHAT MAKES HEALTH PUBLIC? A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF MORAL,
LEGAL, AND POLITICAL CLAIMS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 170 (2012).
191 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. 2d ed. 1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (2001); DANIELS,
supra note 15 (adopting a framework heavily influenced by Rawls).  References to health in R
Rawls’ own work would seem to undercut the usefulness of his theory to an examination of the
mutually reinforcing relationship between poverty and ill health.  Rawls has been criticized for
intentionally restricting his discussion of justice to “normal” “healthy” workers and for relegat-
ing “surfers” (those who are able, but unwilling to work) and “hard cases” (those whose disa-
bility or ill health prevents them from working) to voluntary charity care, echoing the market
justice model.  In his earlier work, Rawls classified health, along with vigor, intelligence, and
imagination, as “natural primary goods” based on his understanding that society had little
influence over them.  Eventually, he dropped the “natural” designation in response to criticism
pointing out the many ways in which health and intelligence are heavily influenced by social
forces.  Rawls noted in passing that we have a “duty” to help people with health issues, but it
cannot be covered under his conception of social justice.  Mahasweta M. Banerjee, Social
Work Scholars’ Representation of Rawls: A Critique, 47 J. SOC. WORK ED. 189, 199–200
(2011) (documenting key changes between the 1971 and 1999 editions of Rawls’ Theory of
Justice and clarifications in Rawls’ 2001 works Justice as Fairness: A Restatement and The
Law of Peoples as part of a critique of social justice-oriented social work scholars’ reliance on
and misrepresentation of Rawls).  Daniels “departs from Rawls by allowing and demanding
that the contractors [(rational, disinterested figures whom Rawls imagines to be deciding on
the principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance)] consider questions of disease and disabil-
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approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum,192 the luck egalitarian-
ism approach developed by Ronald Dworkin, G.A. Cohen, and Richard
Arneson,193 and a strongly communitarian approach to justice that might
be understood as having roots in feminist and relational political philoso-
phies.194  A discussion of the unique contributions of each of these schol-
ars is beyond the scope of this Article (thankfully, given that it would
also be beyond my expertise).195  But the three common themes identi-
fied in the social movements discussed in Part I, above, are also evident
in the work of political philosophers and ethicists on health and social
justice.  Their writings provide useful reference points as I translate the
common commitments of environmental, reproductive, and food justice
to the health justice context.
As a lens for examining the role of law in reducing health dispari-
ties, social justice does not provide clear answers to all questions.
Rather, it reveals certain questions as particularly crucial and prompts
more rigorous discussion of them.  With these caveats in mind, I argue
that three interrelated commitments should shape the health justice ap-
ity to feature in deliberations (an intended omission on Rawls’ part).” COGGON, supra note
190, at 180. R
192 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); POWERS & FADEN, supra note
15 (developing a pragmatic framework that is closely related to the capabilities approach); R
RUGER, supra note 15 (developing a health capabilities approach); VENKATAPURAM, supra R
note 15 (applying Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to health).  Sen himself has also R
written on the application of the capabilities approach to health issues. See, e.g., Amartya Sen,
Why Health Equity?, in PUBLIC HEALTH, ETHICS, AND EQUITY 21 (Sudhir Anand, Fabienne
Peter & Amartya Sen eds., 2004).
193 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000); G.A. Cohen, On the Cur-
rency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989); Richard Arneson, Equality and Equal
Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUDIES 77 (1989); Richard Arneson, Against Rawlsian
Equality of Opportunity, 93 PHIL. STUDIES 7 (1999); SEGALL, supra note 15 (applying the luck R
egalitarianism conception of distributive justice to issues of health care and the social determi-
nants of health).
194 See, e.g., DAN BEAUCHAMP, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND THE BATTLE FOR THE BODY
POLITIC (1996); Dan Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public Health, in
NEW ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 1, at 57; BRUCE JENNINGS, CIVIC HEALTH: R
A POLITICAL THEORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY (forthcoming 2014) (described
by Jennings as a book on the relationship between public health and political theory and the
role of grassroots participation in health policy); WILLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE
PERVERSION OF AUTONOMY: COERCION AND CONSTRAINTS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY (2d ed.
2003); Bruce Jennings, From the Urban to the Civic: The Moral Possibilities of the City, 78 J.
URBAN HEALTH 88 (2001). See COGGON, supra note 190, at 187 (linking Jennings’ communi- R
tarian approach to political theory within the feminist literature).  Kristin Voigt is currently
developing an approach that reconciles distributive and relational justice. See Social Justice:
Reconciling Distributive and Relational Perspectives, MONTREAL HEALTH EQUITY RESEARCH
CONSORTIUM, http://mherc.net/projects/social-justice-reconciling-distributive-and-relational-
perspectives/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2014); Kristin Voigt, Appeals to Individual Responsibility
for Health: Reconsidering the Luck Egalitarianism Perspective, 22 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH-
CARE ETHICS 146 (2013).
195 See COGGON, supra note 190, at 164–93, for an extremely helpful review, upon which R
I have relied heavily in drafting this paragraph.
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proach to using law to reduce health disparities: First, the health justice
framework lends itself to a broad conceptualization of health law as con-
cerned with all of the social determinants of health rather than remaining
narrowly focused on the law of health care delivery and financing.  Sec-
ond, the health justice framework demands that we probe the influence of
social bias and structural advantage on interventions aimed at reducing
health disparities, particularly those interventions that adopt an individu-
alistic, personal responsibility approach.  Third, interventions to reduce
health disparities should be designed and implemented in a way that
maximizes community engagement, but this should not be confused with
an approach that makes individualistic self-determination paramount.  I
will sketch out each of these proposed commitments by reference to the
health justice work of ethicists and political philosophers, the social jus-
tice movements described in Part I, and the health law reforms and con-
troversies described in Part II.  Each of these issues is ripe for further
exploration in future publications.
B. Broadening the Scope of Inquiry and Action: Putting Access to
Health Care in Its Place
Focusing on the experiences of low-income communities, commu-
nities of color, and other socially and culturally marginalized groups has
led the environmental, reproductive, and food justice movements to
broaden the scope of the progressive projects that preceded them: From
protecting the natural environment to fighting the overlapping forms of
oppression that result in an unjust distribution of environmental hazards.
From a privacy-based right to choose abortion to redistribution of re-
sources to protect meaningful self-determination with regard to reproduc-
tion and family life.  From rejection of some forms of industrial food
production to an insistence that food policy can play a role in fighting
class and racial oppression.
In the same way, the health justice framework might function as a
critique from within the progressive patient-rights focused project of en-
suring access to health care.  Health justice naturally expands the focus
beyond access to health care to address the community conditions that
play such an important role in determining health disparities.  Powers
and Faden “contend that it is impossible to make progress in our under-
standing of the demands of justice within medical care without looking
outside of medical care to public health and to the other determinants of
inequalities in health.”196  Beauchamp is a bit more pointed about de-
centering health care.  He argues that “over-investment and over-confi-
dence in curative medical services” are attributable to the market justice
196 POWERS & FADEN, supra note 15, at x. R
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perspective and stand as “fundamental obstacles to collective action to
prevent death and injury.”197
In his seminal work on health justice, Venkatapuram argues that
“health is not determined just by or even largely by healthcare.  It is
vitally important, just as food is to someone starving, but health jus-
tice . . . involves many more dimensions than the availability and distri-
bution of healthcare.”198  Social epidemiologists study the causal
pathways by which socio-economic status, race and ethnicity, disability,
gender expression, geographic location, and other factors influence
health outcomes.199  Differential access to health care services (in terms
of financial access but also language access,200 geographic access,201
etc.) and differential quality of health care (in terms of discriminatory
treatment decisions by individual clinicians, differential access to highly
skilled health care providers, disregard for the needs of particular sub-
populations in medical research,202 etc.) are certainly among those path-
ways, but other pathways are equally, if not more, important.
Application of this view to health policy suggests that health care is a
component of the broader public health system—rather than the other
way around, as many health law scholars assume.
Putting access to health care in its place as one among many social
determinants of health runs counter to decades of health law reform, ac-
tivism, and scholarship.  As Venkatapuram explains, “[F]or most of the
twentieth century, policies to protect and promote health focused on
clinical medical care and on personal behaviour, . . . divorcing it from its
social bases.”203  Daniels links this bias to the bioethics tradition, which,
since its inception “has focused heavily on . . . the dyadic relationship
between doctors and patients or research subjects, or on the potential
benefits and risks for those individuals that can arise from new [medical]
197 BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 104. R
198 VENKATAPURAM, supra note 15, at 16. R
199 See, e.g., MARMOT & WILKINSON, supra note 8; SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY (Lisa F. Berk- R
man & Ichiro Kawachi eds., 2000); Michael G. Marmot, Understanding Social Inequalities in
Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S160 (2003); JULIE G. CWIKEL, SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY:
STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH ACTIVISM (2006).
200 See, e.g., Joel Teitelbaum, Lara Cartwright-Smith & Sara Rosenbaum, Translating
Rights into Access: Language Access and the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 348
(2012).
201 See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Race & Urban Health: Confronting a New Frontier, 5
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 181 (2002); Brietta R. Clark, Hospital Flight from Minority Com-
munities: How Our Existing Civil Rights Framework Fosters Racial Inequality in Healthcare,
9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1023 (2005).
202 See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, Bioprivilege, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2013); Vernel-
lia R. Randall, Inequality in Health Care Is Killing African-Americans, 36 HUMAN RIGHTS 20
(2009); Vernellia R. Randall, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Health Care: A Call for
State Health Care Anti-Discrimination Law, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1 (2006).
203 VENKATAPURAM, supra note 15, at 11. R
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technologies.”204  Health law scholar Bill Sage adds the traditional view
of government regulation as a complement to private legal claims; politi-
cal preferences for policies that save identifiable rather than statistical
lives; and the rise of health consumerism as a frame for health reform as
sources of health law’s relational bias.205
Health law has struggled to define itself as a field,206 and many
scholars essentially conflate it with the law of health care delivery and
financing.207  The law of public health—“what we, as a society, do col-
lectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy”208—has gen-
erally been relegated to a sub-topic of health law, when it is given any
consideration at all.209  The environmental justice movement’s emphasis
on social determinants of environmental health disparities; the reproduc-
tive justice movement’s emphasis on social determinants of maternal,
child, and family health; and the food justice movement’s emphasis on
access to healthy food as a social determinant of health are already
204 DANIELS, supra note 15, at 2.  Daniels began by writing extensively on “the social R
function of health care, broadly construed to include traditional public health and medicine.”
See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985). Just Health, which he represents as a
sequel to Just Health Care, is his effort to “seek answers to a broader set of questions, rectify-
ing what he describes as his previous “failure to understand the full dimensions of a population
view.” Id.  Other influential political philosophers writing about health and social justice have
maintained a dominant focus on access to affordable, high-quality health care. See, e.g.,
RUGER, supra note 15; SEGALL, supra note 15. R
205 Sage, supra note 10, at 501–10. R
206 See Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347 (2006); Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent
Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365 (2006); Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on
Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391 (2006); Theodore W. Ruger, Health
Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625 (2008).
207 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 206, at 370 (treating “health” as synonymous with R
“health care”); Greely’s initial definition of health law is more expansive:
I believe health law should be defined very loosely, as encompassing all legal and
public policy issues involving the provision of health care (medical or otherwise) or
health status.  Importantly, this includes policy questions about what the laws or,
more broadly, the non-legal rules or standards as they affect health care should be
and not just what they are.  Its center, to me, includes issues of access to health care,
assurance of health care quality, and the relationships between patients and health
care providers.  But it also extends to issues of drug and medical device regulation,
bioethics, biomedical research, mental health, and (I would argue) disability discrim-
ination.  I would also extend it to public health issues, from infectious disease to
addiction to obesity, although even I get nervous about extending the definition to
include some issues I think are legitimate public health issues, such as automobile
accidents or crime.
Greely, supra note 206, at 392.  After this initial breadth, however, Greely’s discussion largely R
conflates health with health care or medicine. Id.
208 COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FU-
TURE OF PUBLIC Health 19 (1988).
209 See Greely, supra note 206, at 392; Sage, supra note 10, at 519 (“[P]ublic health R
law . . . has been marginalized both legally and financially compared with the diagnosis and
treatment of individual patients.”).
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broadening the focus of some advocacy groups that target health dispari-
ties.  But most health law scholars and many advocacy groups continue
to focus almost exclusively on health care access.  It is not surprising,
then, that discussions of health disparities in the health law literature
have largely shared this focus.
Three recent articles by progressive health law scholars who discuss
health law as a tool for reducing disparities by drawing parallels between
health law and other socially conscious fields of law, are illustrative.
Sidney Watson’s work on the relationship between health law and civil
rights law argues that “provisions expanding access to affordable health
insurance offer a critical tool to improve minority access to health insur-
ance and reduce inequities both in the health care system and among
communities.”210  Jessica Roberts frames her work on health law as disa-
bility rights law as addressing health disparities, but her focus is similarly
dominated by access to high-quality health care responsive to the needs
of people with disabilities.211  In assessing the ACA in light of global
health and human rights norms, Gwendolyn Majette does discuss the so-
cial determinants of health beyond health care access212 and acknowl-
edges that elimination of health care disparities is a “complex problem
demanding a multifaceted solution.”  However, she considers public
210 Watson, Section 1557, supra note 12, at 855.
211 Roberts, supra note 12.  Roberts purports to address public health issues in two brief R
sections but her discussion barely scratches the surface.  She rightly points out that federal
public health surveillance and research activities have historically excluded health disparities
among people with disabilities as a category of interest—a bias that the ACA attempts to
correct. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 1997–99, 2026–28.  But her interest in this issue is R
largely limited to the “lack of good, reliable data on disability and health-care access” that has
resulted from past omission, and the ACA’s recognition of “people with disabilities as a popu-
lation with its own specific health-care needs.” Id. at 1999, 2027.
212 See Majette, supra note 13, at 935.  Majette references social determinants as an im- R
portant focus of global health norms and the National Prevention, Health Promotion and Public
Health Council (now known simply as the “National Prevention Council”) “to facilitate a
health-in-all-policies approach to eliminate health disparities and improve the daily conditions
in which people live, work, and play.”  Other than her mention of the National Prevention
Council, however, Majette’s discussion of the ACA’s attention to the social determinants of
health focuses on information gathering with respect to disparities in health care access and
quality. See id. at 922–23.  Majette has endorsed a broader view of law as a tool for reducing
health disparities in her other work, however. See Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, Global Health
Law Norms: A Coherent Framework to Understand PPACA’s Approach to Eliminate Health
Disparities and Address Implementation Challenges, in LAW AND GLOBAL HEALTH – CUR-
RENT LEGAL ISSUES 419, 428–29 (Michael Freeman et al. eds., vol. 16, 2014); Gwendolyn
Roberts Majette, PPACA and Public Health: Creating a Framework to Focus on Prevention
and Wellness and Improve the Public’s Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366 (2011).  Majette
joins the call for a shift from a biomedical model to an ecologic, population-based approach as
a way to significantly improve the health of the U.S. population. Id. at 367, 376 n.17.  The
ACA prevention provisions her article describes, however, include many that are dominated by
provisions of preventive health care, as well as wellness incentive programs that adopt a per-
sonal responsibility approach, which is problematic from a social justice perspective. See infra
Part III.C.
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health, prevention, and wellness as one part of the “health care sys-
tem,”213 and her recommendations for future efforts to reduce health dis-
parities for people of color focus almost exclusively on eliminating
disparities in health care access and quality.214  Each of these articles
makes very important contributions,215 and their relatively narrow focus
is completely understandable given that the statute they are analyzing is
similarly focused predominantly on ensuring access to health care.216
Is it advisable, or even feasible to reframe health care access as one
among many social determinants of health, rather than considering public
health law and social determinants as a sub-field of health care law, as
scholars typically do?  To the extent that scholars have grappled with the
expansion of health law and policy to address the social determinants of
health at all, they have highlighted two distinct concerns.  First, a con-
cern that expansion of health law to address the social determinants of
health poses a threat to individual liberty by categorizing personal
problems (such as unhealthy eating and physical inactivity) as public
concerns in an effort to legitimize improper government overreach.217
213 Majette, supra note 13, at 926. R
214 Id. at 926–35.
215 Eliminating racial, ethnic, and other social disparities in health care is an extremely
important issue. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2003).  My point is simply that elimination of health
disparities requires much more than elimination of health care disparities. See id. at 35 (“the
reasons for . . . health status disparities are complex . . . .  Racial and ethnic disparities in
health status largely reflect differences in social, socioeconomic, and behavioral risk factors
and environmental living conditions . . . .  Healthcare is therefore necessary but insufficient in
and of itself to redress racial and ethnic disparities in health status.”).
216 The Affordable Care Act does include significant provisions aimed at ensuring healthy
living conditions and influencing health behaviors.  Perhaps the most important provisions in
this regard are those that provide for funding for community-level action on the social determi-
nants of health, reflecting the importance of state and local—as opposed to federal—interven-
tion in these areas.
217 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421,
1424 (2004) (arguing that labeling health behaviors like diet, exercise, smoking, and tanning as
“public health” problems triggers legal doctrines that privilege heavy handed state intervention
over protection of individual rights: “[T]he case for government intervention . . . gets that extra
boost of legitimacy” when framed as a public health issue”); Richard A. Epstein, Let the
Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY &
MED. S138 (2003) (critiquing “new public health”); Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do
About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361 (2005); Mark A. Roth-
stein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 144, 148–49 (2002)
[hereinafter Rothstein, Rethinking] (“The broad power of government to protect public health
includes the authority to supersede individual liberty and property interests in the name of
preserving the greater public good.  It is an awesome responsibility, and therefore it cannot and
must not be used indiscriminately.”); Mark A. Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health: A Re-
sponse, 2 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 84, 85 (2009) [hereinafter Rothstein, Limits] (“One of the main
reasons that I support a narrow definition of public health is that public health laws give public
health officials a range of coercive powers to protect the population.  Unless the scope of
permissible governmental action is carefully circumscribed, there is a threat to civil liberties by
governmental confiscation of property, restraint on the movement of individuals, mandating of
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And second, a concern that while elimination of poverty, racism, and
other injustices might be laudable and appropriate governmental con-
cerns, cooptation of these efforts under the banner of health is inappro-
priate and possibly counterproductive.218
The first concern, which I will call the libertarian objection, is often
cast by public health advocates as motivated largely by a desire to protect
powerful industries from regulation and liability.  Particularly “[w]hen
public health advocates seek to address the root causes of non-communi-
cable diseases and injuries, they put themselves on a collision course
with powerful, wealthy interests that are contributing to those public
health problems.”219  I have argued elsewhere, however, that legal schol-
ars should engage more productively with the libertarian objection in an
effort to more fully develop the basis for treating non-communicable dis-
ease threats like heart disease and diabetes as public problems demand-
ing collective action.220
The second concern, which I will call the progressive objection, is
more rarely addressed by health law scholars and perhaps less easily dis-
missed.  Most of this Article is devoted to exploring the value of examin-
ing health disparities through the lens of social justice.  But what value is
added when activists or scholars situated within the field of health law
and policy discuss social injustice in terms of health disparities?  Why
not simply focus on the narrower areas of our expertise—health care
financing and delivery or the authority of public health agencies—and
leave discussion of economic and racial injustice to others?  In her work
on health policy and social justice, Jennifer Prah Ruger argues that it is
medical examinations and similar measures.”); Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public
Health Law, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S199 (2003); Roger Magnusson, Mapping
the Scope and Opportunities for Public Health Law in Liberal Democracies, 35 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 571, 573 (2007) (“Debate about [the] goals and definitions [of public health law] re-
flects competing claims about the boundaries for the legitimate exercise of political and ad-
ministrative power.”).
218 See Hall, supra note 217, at S208 (“Beyond the public health arena, there are other R
good reasons for the government to pursue the more general aims of education, taxation, regu-
lation, and redistribution, but these are broader social and economic policies or they belong to
legal realms other than health.  Public health advocates can be commended for calling our
attention to the health implications of social disparities, but health promotion should not be the
primary objective of corrective measures.”); Rothstein, Rethinking, supra note 217, at 144 R
(“[J]ust because war, crime, hunger, poverty, illiteracy, homelessness, and human rights
abuses interfere with the health of individuals and populations does not mean that eliminating
these conditions is part of the mission of public health.”); Rothstein Limits, supra note 217, at R
86 (“[C]oncerns about social justice should play a part in priority setting for public health.  My
point is simply that resolution of underlying socioeconomic and political problems is beyond
the domain of public health.”).
219 Wiley et al., supra note 185, at 89–90. R
220 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
207 (2012).
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“unwise to attempt to improve health with broad non-health policies.”221
She suggests that the broad-based approaches to eliminating health dis-
parities advocated by Daniels and others “cloud rather than clarify the
means and ends of health policy, and diminish our ability to evaluate
public policy’s impact on health.”222
The incorporation of the environmental justice movement into
mainstream environmental law might serve as something of a cautionary
tale with regard to the progressive objection.  Initially, environmental
justice lawyering and legal scholarship were largely channeled toward
the use of Title VI to challenge the disparate impact of governmental
decisions about environmental protection on minority groups.223  When
those efforts were foreclosed by the federal executive’s unwillingness to
adopt a Title VI strategy and the Supreme Court’s imposition of insur-
mountable hurdles for private advocates interested in doing so, many
scholars and environmental lawyers interested in environmental justice
redirected their attention to strengthening environmental protection laws
for everyone with the hope that this strategy would have disparate bene-
fits for the socially disadvantaged.224  Arguably, the effect has been to
221 RUGER, supra note 15, at 100.  Notably, Ruger and some scholars adopt a broad scope R
of inquiry when addressing global health disparities, while tending to narrow their focus on
health care when addressing disparities in the U.S. context. See, e.g., Jennifer Prah Ruger,
Normative Foundations of Global Health Law, 96 GEO. L.J. 423 (2008) (“extending [Ruger’s
theory of health and social justice] in evaluating the role of international law in health” and
adopting a broad focus on public health issues ranging from infectious disease control to occu-
pational hazards, tobacco control, and transboundary environmental pollution).  The fact that
international health law instruments, unlike domestic health law statutes, focus predominantly
on public health concerns  rather than medical care may help explain this focus, but global
health law extends beyond international instruments to encompass domestic policies in the
global context.  In her monograph, Ruger explicitly notes that “the relationship between health
policy and other public policies affecting health” is “particularly relevant to developing coun-
tries, where many determinants of health lie outside the health care system.” RUGER, supra
note 15, at 99 (emphasis added).  Venkatapuram takes the opposite position, arguing that “en- R
suring health and longevity capabilities will require the functioning and fixing of many basic
social institutions, processes and values, as well as . . . perpetual monitoring and management
of relative social inequalities . . . , especially in wealthy countries.” VENKATAPURAM, supra
note 15, at 152 (emphasis added).  This interesting dichotomy warrants further examination. R
222 RUGER, supra note 15, at 100.  Ruger suggests that evaluation of policies in “non- R
health” domains like employment, housing, or education might be supplemented with “indica-
tors that take their effects on health into account,” but that is not her primary concern. Id. at
100–01.
223 See Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: The Brief His-
tory of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 309 (1994).
224 See Mike Ewall, Legal Tools for Environmental Equity vs. Environmental Justice, 13
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4 (2012–2013) (describing the blow to the environmental
justice movement’s litigation strategy inflicted by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275
(2001), and Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), that effectively foreclosed private
suits alleging disparate impact discrimination under Title VI and the resulting shift toward
generally applicable environmental protection policies as a tool for addressing environmental
injustice).
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neutralize environmental justice as a distinct lens, reducing it to a super-
ficial reframing of the same old environmental protection goals in a way
that builds broader appeal beyond the traditionally white, economically
privileged groups that have prioritized them.
Watson’s, Roberts’, and Majette’s contributions might be viewed as
moving toward a similar approach.  Each of them shepherds evidence
regarding health disparities in support of traditionally progressive health
law goals.  Watson highlights the ACA’s anti-discrimination provision as
a potential avenue for continuing the desegregation of health care begun
under Title VI.  Roberts sets up health law provisions aimed at ensuring
access and quality for all as having a disparate benefit for people with
disabilities.  Majette explicitly positions herself as championing the
ACA’s access and quality reforms as an important step toward American
realization of individual rights and norms recognized in international
law.  Each author’s call for attention to the positive impacts of ACA
reforms on health disparities adds value to the broader conversation
among health law academics and advocates about health reform, but ulti-
mately frames health disparities as a reason to support the general health
law reforms championed by progressives.  These are certainly crucial
goals, but their narrow focus on health care access is regrettable.
Environmental justice scholarship has been at its most productive
when it pushes for a broader inquiry into the root causes of racial and
economic disparities in the distribution of environmental risks and bene-
fits that moves past citing those disparities as yet another reason for sup-
porting general environmental protection.  I believe health justice
scholarship should similarly push for expansive and rigorous examina-
tion of the causal pathways by which social disadvantage translates into
poor health, and of the role of law and policy (and not merely health law
and policy) in reinforcing or disrupting those pathways.
Elsewhere, I have defended the broad scope of health law225 and the
centering of social justice in the study of public health law as a distinct
field.226  Here, my aim is different and perhaps more radical.  Here, I am
225 See Wiley, supra note 220. R
226 See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 17.  Controversy over the implications of social R
epidemiology for legal advocacy and scholarship also permeate recent discussions over how
public health law should be defined as a field distinct from the law of health care financing and
delivery.  Some legal scholars who identify themselves as working within a social determi-
nants of health framework, including myself, have placed social justice at the center of their
inquiries about the role of law in protecting the public’s health in general and reducing health
disparities in particular.  In 2000, the first edition of Lawrence Gostin’s seminal text on mod-
ern public health law asserted that “[t]he prime objective of public health law is to pursue the
highest possible level of physical and mental health in the population, consistent with the
values of social justice.” LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RE-
STRAINT  4 (1st ed. 2000); see also GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 17.  Other scholars, however, R
have questioned the propriety of defining the field in terms of its commitment to social justice.
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suggesting that rather than viewing public health law as a distinct sub-
field within health law, scholars interested in the use of law as a tool for
reducing health disparities would do well to view access to health care as
a distinct (and very important) issue within a broader social determinants
framework.  Rather than defending social justice as the “core value” of
public health law, I am arguing—particularly in light of the ACA’s trans-
formation of the Medicaid program, the private health insurance market,
and the government’s role in ensuring the quality of health care and con-
taining its costs as matters of public concern—that social justice is
emerging as a core value of health law writ large.  I am not suggesting
that social justice provides an organizing principle for health law field-
building efforts.  Social justice cannot, by itself, define the contours of
health law as a coherent field of academic inquiry.  But I do believe that
more rigorous development of social justice as an approach to practic-
ing, studying, teaching, and writing about health law—and as an alterna-
tive to the libertarian market competition paradigm and the progressive
patient rights paradigm—is likely to further the development of health
law as a field.227
C. Collective Responsibility: Probing the Influence of Bias on Health
Disparity Interventions
In addition to intentionally broadening the scope of inquiry beyond
narrow, siloed concerns, the environmental, reproductive, and food jus-
tice movements have adopted a skeptical stance toward elitism within the
progressive projects that preceded them.  Each movement has probed the
influence of class and racial bias on the goals and processes adopted by
progressive reformers.  In doing so, the three movements have particu-
larly highlighted the importance of collective responsibility for assuring
healthy living conditions, rather than reinforcing individualistic assump-
tions about personal responsibility for health.
In the same way, health justice as a framework for reducing health
disparities might dictate a preference for interventions that reflect collec-
tive responsibility for health rather than individualistic interventions
aimed at urging people to change their behaviors without necessarily
Micah Berman has suggested that health law’s lack of a “readily apparent normative value—
like environmentalism—[to use] as an organizing principle” impedes its coherence as a field.
Micah L. Berman, Defining the Field of Public Health Law, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
45, 58 (2013).  Berman argues that as potential organizing principles, law and economics and
social justice “reflect the ideological and methodological approach of the scholar, but fail to
illuminate anything unique about the study of health law.” Id.
227 In this, it would seem that Berman and I are in agreement. See Berman, note 226, at R
58 n.60 (“Many foundational fields, including Contracts, Torts, and Property, are regularly
taught from either a law and economics or a social justice perspective.  These perspectives
bring valuable insights to the fields, but do not define them.”).
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making it easier for them to do so.  Beauchamp describes “explanations
for death and disability that ‘blame the victim’” as “yet another way in
which the market ethic obstructs the possibilities for minimizing death
and disability, and alibis the need for structural change.”228  In
Beauchamp’s view,
Victim-blaming misdefines structural and collective
problems of the entire society as individual problems,
seeing these problems as caused by the behavioral fail-
ures or deficiencies of the victims.  These behavioral ex-
planations for public problems tend to protect the larger
society and powerful interests from the burdens of col-
lective action, and instead encourage attempts to change
the ‘faulty’ behavior of victims.229
In the same vein, Voigt has suggested that personal responsibility inter-
ventions to discourage unhealthy behaviors through individually targeted
incentives and penalties are counter to the communitarian commitment
of social justice.230
Our increasingly collective approach to ensuring health care access
is undeniably generating increased public interest in the root causes of
poor health.  There is deep disagreement, however, over whether those
root causes are a matter of collective responsibility or personal responsi-
bility.  On the one hand, social epidemiology suggests that social, eco-
nomic, and environmental factors are the true “causes of the causes” of
death, disease, and disability, demanding collective responsibility for
regulation of commercial activities that are harmful to the public’s health
and assurance of social support for basic human needs.  On the other
hand, measures that put the onus on individuals to change their behaviors
(without necessarily making it more feasible for them to do so) are far
more politically palatable.  Many of the most important drivers of death,
illness, and injury in the United States—cancer, heart disease, diabetes,
and stroke attributable to alcohol and tobacco use, unhealthy eating, and
physical inactivity—are constructed as matters of individual choice and
personal responsibility.  These behaviors are “divorced” from their social
bases in the popular imagination and in much of health law and policy
scholarship.231
In emphasizing the social determinants of health, the environmental,
reproductive, and food justice movements adopt the “ecological” model
of health that has come to dominate public health science and practice,
228 Beauchamp, supra note 1, at 104 R
229 Id. at 104; see also VENKATAPURAM, supra note 15, at 77 (arguing that outdated mod- R
els of disease “misclassif[y] causes as beyond social action”).
230 Voigt, supra note 194. R
231 VENKATAPURAM, supra note 15, at 11. R
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but that ecological model has not yet fully permeated into the public
consciousness, particularly with respect to NCDs.  Early efforts to pre-
vent so-called “lifestyle diseases” were heavily influenced by the behav-
ioral model of public health, which emphasized the importance of
individual behavior choices (about diet, exercise, smoking, drug and al-
cohol use, etc.)232  Strategies developed in the 1980s and 1990s relied
almost exclusively on public education campaigns and doctor-patient
counseling.233
Among scientists and environmental, reproductive, and food justice
advocacy groups the individualistic behavioral model has been eclipsed
by the ecological model, which places supposedly private, individual
choices and risks into their social context and emphasizes structural ex-
planations for health behaviors and outcomes.  In this view, using to-
bacco, abusing alcohol, or eating a diet high in calories and fat and low
in nutrients are not merely a matter of personal choice.  These behaviors
are heavily influenced by environmental factors: an information environ-
ment that is loaded with commercial marketing by the manufacturers and
sellers of harmful products234 and marketplaces that are saturated with
unhealthy options that are cheaper and more readily accessible than
healthy choices.235  Not getting enough exercise is not simply a personal
failure, it is a behavior influenced by a built environment that discour-
ages walking for transportation and provides few opportunities for active
entertainment.236  In turn, the environments that one lives and works in
are dependent upon underlying social and economic factors.  Poor neigh-
borhoods have more fast food establishments, liquor stores, and corner
stores, and fewer full-service grocery stores than middle-income neigh-
borhoods.237  Children from low-income families are more likely to live
in communities where public parks and playgrounds are in disrepair and
232 See Wiley, supra note 220, at 219–21 (describing the rise of the behavioral model of R
health).
233 Id.
234 See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. MOORE, IT’S CHILD’S PLAY: ADVERGAMING AND THE ONLINE
MARKETING OF FOOD TO CHILDREN – REPORT (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/
entmedia/upload/7536.pdf; CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, PESTERING PARENTS: HOW
FOOD COMPANIES MARKET OBESITY TO CHILDREN (2003), available at http://www.cspinet.org/
new/pdf/pages_from_pestering_parents_final_pt_1.pdf; David Ashton, Food Advertising and
Childhood Obesity, 97 J. Royal Soc’y Med. 51 (2004).
235 See, e.g., Diller & Graff, supra note 173; Adam Drewnowski, Obesity and the Food R
Environment: Dietary Energy Density and Diet Costs, 27 Am. J. Prev. Med. 154 (2004).
236 See, e.g., Wendy C. Perdue, Obesity, Poverty, and the Built Environment: Challenges
and Opportunity, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 821 (2008); Montrece McNeil Ransom
et al., Pursuing Health Equity: Zoning Codes and Public Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94
(2011)
237 See, e.g., Neissa Smith, Eatin’ Good? Not in This Neighborhood: A Legal Analysis of
Disparities in Food Availability and Quality at Chain Supermarkets in Poverty-Stricken Areas,
14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 197, 217 (2009).
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where the threat of violence keeps people indoors.238  Predominantly Af-
rican-American or Latino communities are more likely to be affected by
communicable disease, substance abuse, mental health problems, and
other risks that are exacerbated by disproportionate incarceration rates.239
But this ecological approach runs up against long-standing bias to-
ward individualistic explanations of disease.  Attribution of chronic dis-
ease, substance abuse, and other health problems to personal failures
“[s]erves a symbolic, or value expressive function . . . reinforcing a
world view consistent with a belief in a just world, self determination,
the Protestant work ethic, self-contained individualism, and the notion
that people get what they deserve.”240  Rhetoric that frames health dis-
parities in terms of personal responsibility for unhealthy behavior
choices also implicates class, racial, and other forms of bias and struc-
tural disadvantage.  Efforts to reveal the importance of economic and
social factors that influence individual health behaviors run the risk of
overstating the associations between poverty or race and unhealthy be-
havior.  Measures that target the individual behaviors of low-income or
nonwhite people as “unhealthy”—such SNAP restrictions or Medicaid
wellness reforms—are inherently suspect from a social justice standpoint
and should be carefully assessed.
Libertarian objections to public health paternalism have garnered a
great deal of attention in recent years,241 while social justice objections
have been underappreciated.  The rich discussion over the role of pater-
nalism in ensuring environmental justice provide useful lessons that
might be fruitfully applied to similar conundrums in public health law
and policy.  Indian law and poverty law scholar Ezra Rosser has de-
scribed the challenge presented by an informed decision by a Native
American tribal government to approve or conduct environmentally
harmful waste disposal or natural resource removal activities on tribal
land.242
Separating good from bad and right from wrong is easy
when tribes are suffering from the policies or practices
238 See, e.g., Gary Bennet et al., Safe to Walk?: Neighborhood Safety and Physical Activ-
ity Among Public Housing Residents, 4 PLOS MED. 1599, 1603 (2007); Dustin Duncan et al.,
Association Between Neighborhood Safety and Overweight Status Among Urban Adolescents,
BMC PUBLIC HEALTH (Aug. 11, 2009) http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/289.
239 Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 275, 280–81 (2008); James C. Thomas & Elizabeth Torrone, Incarceration as
Forced Migration: Effects on Selected Community Health Outcomes, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
S181, S182–83 (2008).
240 Christian S. Crandall & Rebecca Martinez, Culture, Ideology, and Antifat Attitudes, 22
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1165, 1166 (1996).
241 See Wiley et al., supra note 185. R
242 Ezra Rosser, supra note 44, at 469; see also JAMES M. GRIJALVA, CLOSING THE CIR- R
CLE: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2008).
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of non-Indians, without tribal involvement, that reflect
environmental racism or environmental injustice.  It is
much harder to know if environmental racism or injus-
tice is involved when a tribe itself makes “an affirmative
and informed decision to undertake an environmentally
controversial project.”243
As Rosser points out, the environmental justice movement has, from its
inception, tackled the potential tensions between environmental protec-
tion and economic growth:
In 1991, at the First National People of Color Environ-
mental Leadership Summit, a broad concept of social
justice that recognized “both public health and economic
opportunity as indispensible aspects of the quality of
life” emerged.  Those at the summit concluded that
“people should not be faced with choosing between an
unsafe livelihood and unemployment.”244
On the one hand, the fact that tribal governments generally opt to permit
environmentally harmful activities because those governments’ limited
economic opportunities may justify the objection of environmental
groups—and even environmental justice groups.  On the other hand, de-
nying tribes the right to participate in environmental degradation in the
same way that other self-governing groups do negates their sovereignty.
Reproductive justice scholars have also deeply probed the race and class
biases evident in abortion—on both sides of the issue.245  And recent
food justice scholarship evinces a similar critical self-examination with
regard to issues of race and class.246  The health justice movement is not
alone in struggling to reconcile recognition and redistribution as distinct,
and potentially compatible, goals.
Health advocates argue that low-income or nonwhite consumers dis-
proportionately “choose” unhealthy food and beverage products because
they are cheaper and more heavily marketed.  Laws and polices discour-
aging, or even restricting, those choices serve as a needed counter-weight
to industry influence.  At the same time, singling out poor or nonwhite
consumers for paternalistic restrictions that could not feasibly be im-
posed on all consumers (as the targeted permitting restriction in L.A.
County did or SNAP restrictions would) raises legitimate concerns.
USDA’s 2007 report opposing proposed SNAP restrictions concludes,
243 Rosser, supra note 44, at 469 (quoting A. Cassidy Sehgal, Note, Indian Tribal Sover- R
eignty and Waste Disposal Regulation, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 431, 454 (1994)).
244 Id. at 470.
245 See Mary Ziegler, Roe’s Race: The Supreme Court, Population Control, and Repro-
ductive Justice, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2013).
246 See Goldberg, supra note 72. R
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“the problems of poor food choices, unhealthy diets, and excessive
weight characterize all segments of American society; the basis for sin-
gling out low-income food stamp recipients and imposing unique restric-
tions on their food choices is not clear.”247  As FRAC has put it, “those
suggesting strategies aimed uniquely at keeping poor people from the
normal streams of decision-making and commerce bear a burden of justi-
fying that targeting.”248
The reproductive justice movement’s insistence that women have
the right to determine whether and how they mother regardless of their
dependence upon social assistance might also suggest new ways of think-
ing about the social justice implications of proposals to restrict access to
and use of public benefits in the name of reducing health disparities.
Joan Chrisler, for example, notes that “[u]nlike reproductive rights,
which can be seen as based on the principle of negative rights (i.e., the
right to resist being told by authorities what one can and cannot do with
one’s own body), reproductive justice is based on the principle of posi-
tive rights,” which she roots in a communitarian commitment to “support
[for] pursuit of a good quality of life” as the legitimating purpose of
government authority.249
The social justice framework demands more rigorous attention to
these issues.  Scholars and lawyers have an obligation to probe proposed
interventions—ostensibly aimed at reducing health disparities—more
deeply for evidence of social, cultural, and structural bias.  It might be
tempting to point to proposals to restrict SNAP benefits or Medicaid
wellness reforms as positive indications that policymakers have made
reducing health disparities a bipartisan public priority.  But, as I have
argued elsewhere, the heavy emphasis on personal responsibility that
permeates these proposals threatens to do more harm than good to the
cause of progressive reformers interested in changing our social and
physical environments to facilitate healthier lifestyles.250  It might be
tempting to dismiss the opposition of civil rights, anti-poverty, or anti-
hunger groups as evidence of industry influence, but to do so would be to
pass up an important opportunity to more fully explore and articulate the
relationships between health and social justice.
247 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., IMPLICATIONS OF RESTRICTING THE USE OF FOOD STAMP BENE-
FITS – SUMMARY (2007), http://www.fns.usda.gov/ora/menu/Published/snap/FILES/Program
Operations/FSPFoodRestrictions.pdf.
248 FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CTR. A REVIEW OF STRATEGIES TO BOLSTER SNAP’S
ROLE IN IMPROVING NUTRITION AS WELL AS FOOD SECURITY 13 (2013), available at http://frac
.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SNAPstrategies.pdf.
249 Chrisler, supra note 58, at 4. R
250 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity Control, 47
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 121 (2013).
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D. Collective Action: Moving Beyond Expert-Driven Agendas to
Community Engagement
In addition to broadening the agendas of the progressive projects
that preceded them and probing the substantive goals of those projects
for the influence of elitism and bias, the environmental, reproductive,
and food justice movements have also emphasized the importance of rec-
ognition, participatory engagement, and voice for historically under-
represented groups.  The insistence on participatory engagement has, in
some cases, contributed to a sense of unease regarding the role of law-
yers and other formally educated experts.  It has also prompted fruitful
examination of the tension between pursuing particular legal reforms that
experts believe would best serve the interests of the poor and socially
disenfranchised and the autonomy of those groups to choose other ap-
proaches that might be disfavored by experts.  Scholars of  “new social
justice lawyering” as a practice untethered to any particular issue-based
movement, have particularly emphasized the ways in which poverty acts
as “a barrier to accessing the legal system and to exercising political
power.”251  Some, like Ascanio Piomelli, have gone so far as to suggest a
shift in “what we mean by and count as social justice and social
change”—a shift away from substantive law reform to better serve the
interests of low-income and otherwise marginalized communities and to-
ward a process-based conception of social justice lawyering as a demo-
cratic, participatory, collaborative project to ensure recognition of and
self-determination for marginalized individuals.252
Although the environmental justice, reproductive justice, and food
justice movements have continued to champion substantive law reforms
aimed at ensuring a fair distribution of risks and benefits, commitment to
participatory engagement by the poor and socially marginalized in deci-
sion-making processes that concern their interests is clearly a hallmark of
each movement.  In the same way, the health justice framework might
root ongoing efforts to ensure access to health care and healthy living
conditions more firmly in community engagement and participatory par-
ity.  Jennifer Prah Ruger describes her capabilities approach to health and
social justice as emphasizing both opportunity and process elements of
freedom.  “The process aspect makes public participation and delibera-
tion in political decisions and social choice a constitutive part of public
policy.”  Quoting Amartya Sen, she notes that “[t]hese processes are cru-
251 Artika R. Tyner, Planting People, Growing Justice: The Three Pillars of New Social
Justice Lawyering, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 219, 219–20 (2013).
252 Ascanio Piomelli, Sensibilities for Social Justice Lawyers, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POV-
ERTY L.J. 177, 177, 182–83 (2013).
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cial to the formation of values and priorities . . . and we cannot . . . take
preferences as given independently of public discussion.”253
The Obama administration’s efforts to engage a wide range of
stakeholders and community voices on the issues of health disparities
and environmental justice are laudable.  But the most impactful public
health measures are being pioneered at the local level.  And although
local government is typically associated with greater democratic engage-
ment, in the case of many recent healthy eating and tobacco control mea-
sures, there has been a deliberate attempt to eschew political
accountability in favor of insulated experts.
Mayor Bloomberg’s administration explicitly framed its pioneering
public health law interventions as efforts to reduce health disparities.
These measures threaten the interests of politically powerful industries,
and for that reason it is perhaps entirely understandable that Bloomberg
pursued them through his Board of Health, which is far more insulated
from political accountability than the directly elected City Council.  On
the other hand, public health, local government, and administrative law
scholars have been critical of the anti-democratic nature of Bloomberg’s
strategy.254  For example, public health law scholar Wendy Parmet has
recently suggested that popular backlash against Bloomberg-style inter-
ventions might be better understood as anti-expertise and pro-democratic
process, rather than anti-paternalistic.  Parmet’s argument makes sense to
me, and I have similarly written about the importance of framing public
health intervention in terms of democratic engagement—communities
coming together to protect their health collectively in ways that they can-
not accomplish individually.255  By pursuing the substantive reforms be-
lieved to be in the interests of the poor without recognizing affected
community members as full participants in a collaborative problem-solv-
ing process, the Bloomberg strategy epitomizes a remedy for maldistri-
bution that exacerbates misrecognition.256  Bloomberg’s public health
legacy raises important and difficult questions about how best to recon-
cile the substantive and procedural aims of social justice.
It is difficult to argue against procedural fairness, but the highly
individualistic notion of participatory engagement that permeates the
253 RUGER, supra note 15, at 55. R
254 See, e.g., Rick Hills, The Soda Portion Cap, Redux: Why Are New York City’s Agen-
cies More Constrained than Federal Agencies, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 30, 2013), http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/07/the-soda-portion-cap-redux-why-are-new-york-
citys-agencies-more-constrained-than-federal-agencies.html; but see Paul Diller, Local Health
Agencies, The Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of Woodrow Wilson, 41 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 1859 (2013) (arguing that Bloomberg’s Board of Health could have better insulated the
portion cap rule from a separation of powers challenge by relying more explicitly on its health
sciences expertise).
255 See Wiley et al, supra note 185. R
256 FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 35, at 86–87. R
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new social justice lawyering movement is inconsistent with the commu-
nitarian emphasis of the emerging health justice movement.  The reality
is that individual rights to self-determination can, in some instances, un-
dermine community goals.  Recent decisions by the Canadian, Israeli,
and Brazilian courts to strike down provisions that strengthen publically
financed health care systems by abrogating individual rights to circum-
vent the public system are instructive here.257  Canadian health law
scholar Colleen Flood, Israeli health law scholar Ayeal Gross, and others
argue persuasively that rights-based arguments for access to health care
grounded in individual rights to self-determination are undermining col-
lective interests in cases across the globe.258  It is perhaps a stretch to
suggest that the private cause of action to enforce federal Medicaid law
could be similarly dangerous, but the Obama administration’s position on
this issue—that private litigation threatens to undermine delicate negotia-
tions between the federal government and the states over the sus-
tainability of the Medicaid program as a whole—does strike a similar
note.259
Again, environmental justice scholarship offers a wealth of rigorous
thinking about similar issues regarding the decisions of socially disad-
vantaged communities to take on environmental risks in exchange for
(real or perceived) economic benefits.  Notably, this environmental jus-
tice scholarship has implicitly adopted an orientation toward collective
engagement, rather than reifying the individual as the central focus of
discussions about justice and fairness.  In this regard, it provides a help-
ful model for bridging the gap between the highly individualistic orienta-
tion of the new social justice lawyering movement—which prioritizes the
self-determination of individual clients over the lawyer’s conception of a
good outcome—and the strongly communitarian orientation of the health
justice movement.
For health justice, the key may be to optimize participatory engage-
ment as a matter of the collectively-held right of communities to protect
themselves from hazards and to act together to ensure that essential
needs are met.  Arguments against state and federal preemption of local
257 See Ayeal Gross, Is There a Human Right to Health Care?, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
138 (2013) (describing the use of rights-based arguments to reinforce privatization of health
care and describing the Chaoulli (Canada) and Kiryati (Israel) cases); Octavio Luiz Motta
Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities? 11 HEALTH
& HUM. RTS. 33 (2009).
258 See generally THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014).
259 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curaie Supporting Petitioner, Douglas v. Indep.
Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158 and 10-283), available at http://
www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2010/3mer/1ami/2009-0958.mer.ami.pdf.
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government public health authority are on point here.260  Examples of
community engagement as a strategy for ensuring that measures to re-
duce health disparities are consistent with broader social justice goals
have begun to garner some scholarly attention.  For example, the Los
Angeles anti-fast-food permitting ordinance, which raises a red flag by
targeting low-income and nonwhite neighborhoods, can perhaps be re-
deemed by its democratic origins.261  The ordinance was developed
through collaborative engagement between formally-trained experts and
community groups and enjoys broad public support.262  Compromises
hammered out in state legislatures between public health advocates and
civil rights advocates over the move to primary enforcement seat belt
laws offer a similarly hopeful counter-example to the anti-democratic
narrative about the Bloomberg legacy.263  When interventions to address
racial profiling in traffic stops were incorporated into primary enforce-
ment seatbelt bills, the result was a win for public health and for broader
social justice goals.
CONCLUSION
In spite of growing agreement that health law can and should be
used as a tool for reducing health disparities, there has been little explo-
ration of what social justice offers in the way of a conceptual framework
for health law scholarship, activism, and reform distinct from the cur-
rently dominant paradigms of market competition and patient rights.  We
may or may not be seeing the beginnings of a “health justice” movement.
But either way, I believe that health law advocates and scholars have
much to gain from more rigorous engagement with the fruitful ideas be-
ing generated in legal scholarship influenced by the environmental, re-
productive, and food justice movements and by political philosophers
and ethicists writings on the multifaceted relationship between social jus-
tice and health.  In this Article, I have proposed three interrelated “health
justice” commitments for the use of law as a tool for reducing health
disparities.  Others adopting a health justice framework may add to this
list or may disagree with me altogether, but my purpose is to start a
conversation, not to end one.
260 See Mark Pertschuk et al., Assessing the Impact of Federal and State Preemption in
Public Health: A Framework for Decision Makers, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 213
(2013) (discussing the negative impact of preemption on grassroots movement building).
261 See LaVonna Blair Lewis et al., Transforming the Urban Food Desert from the Grass-
roots Up: A Model for Community Change, 34 FAMILY & COMMUNITY HEALTH S92 (2011)
(describing the coalition of community groups, informed by research, that led to the adoption
of the Interim Control Ordinance in South Los Angeles).
262 Id.
263 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 144 (noting compromise measures reached in R
several state legislatures that incorporated interventions to address racial profiling into bills
adopting primary enforcement for seat belt mandates).
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In the absence of more rigorous engagement with the social justice
framework, there is a risk that “each reform effort [will be] perceived as
an isolated exception to the norm of market-justice [while] the norm it-
self still stands.”264  Many (though not all) of the interventions being
proposed and deployed in the name of reducing health disparities are
encouraging from a social justice standpoint.  “But as long as these ac-
tions are seen as merely minor exceptions to the rule of individual re-
sponsibility, the goals of public health will remain beyond our reach.
What is required is for the public to see that protecting the public’s
health takes us beyond the norms of market-justice categorically, and
necessitates a completely new health ethic.”265  The health justice frame-
work offers a powerful critique of the ways in which market justice—
even in its progressive form with an emphasis on patient rights and equal
opportunity—shores up a narrow vision of health that is dominated by
the health care industry, an impoverished vision of community as the
mere aggregation of quasi-contractual relationships between autonomous
and atomized individuals and their exogenous social environment, and a
lopsided vision of reform as driven by privileged experts who fail to
engage meaningfully with the communities they seek to serve.
264 Beauchamp, supra note 1, at 105. R
265 Id.
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